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ABSTRACT

An attempt is made to evaluate leadership in the
Liberal party of Canada in the context of a particular form of
selection process.

In particular, the relationship of pragmatic,

"brokerage” leadership to the degree of conflict or consensus
characteristic of the selection process is explored.

Utilizing

existing historical and quantitative research, the nature of
leadership selection in the Liberal party can be seen as
basically a consensual, rather than competitive (democratic),
process.

This characteristic is largely a result of the

prevailing structure and ideology of the party, as well as of
the leadership convention itself.

It can be maintained, there

fore, that the performance of party leaders within the political
system may well be more related to the nature of party, than
to a mere pragmatic response to certain societal conditions.

ii
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

AN APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
Canadian party leaders^ have been the subject of a
relatively extensive volume of scholarly.research.

The

analysis, however, of leadership in Canadian parties has been
largely confined within what may be termed the historical
approach.2

This approach generally contains two basic

deficiencies - an exaggerated emphasis on personality as
opposed to ideological, institutional or social factors,^
and an inordinate or complete stress on the "output" aspect
of party leaders at the expense of a consideration of

l"Party leader" refers strictly to individuals who are
recognized as the leader of the party in terms of both its
electoral and Parliamentary activity.
2Some examples of the historical school are: Joseph
Schull, Laurier: The First Canadian. (Toronto: Macmillan, 1965);
H. B. Neatby, William Lyon Mackenzie King: 1924-1932. The
Lonely Heights. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963);
Kenneth McNaught, A Prophet in Politics: A Biography of J.
Woodsworth. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959); and
Bruce Hutchison, Mr. Prime Minister. 1867-1964. (Toronto;
Longmans, 1964).
^Two works which have studied leadership in the context
of wider institutional or ideological variables are W. D. Young,
The Anatomy of a Party: The National CCF. 1932-1961. (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1967) and J. L. Granatstein, The
Politics of Survival: The Conservative Party of Canada. 1939-1945.
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967).
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"input" variables.

4

The aim of this study is to redress

partially this imbalance by analyzing leadership

as a

dependent rather than an independent variable in the
political process.

Therefore, by focusing on the selection

of party leaders, analysis is directed at the ideological
and institutional context, particularly the political party,
in which leadership emerges.

In this manner, party leaders

are viewed as a response to influences fashioned by their
institutional and ideological environment.
The selection of party leaders in the Liberal Party
of Canada from 1919 to 1968 commends itself to a study of
leadership in the above context.

The characteristics of the

party in this period which facilitate analysis derive from
the relative stability of key variables involved in leadership
selection - (1) the permanence of the national party
convention as the mechanism of leadership selection.

4ln other words, interest has been focused on the
leader* s capability of influencing the environment at the
expense of attention to factors which have molded leadership
end influenced its capabilities. An example of this approach
resides in R. M. Dawson*s evaluation of the leadership of
Prime Minister Mackenzie King: "Political leadership, in
short, must always meet two tests: the ability to gain and
stay in power, and the ability to use power once it has been
gained." Dawson, R. M. "Mackenzie King as leader", in Party
Politics in Canada. 2nd edition, ed. H. G. Thorbum.
(Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1967) p. 129.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

(2) the relatively constant party situation, and (3) the
continuity of leadership and leadership style in the party.
The August 1919 convention which chose Mackenzie King was
the archetype for selection of subsequent Liberal leaders.
Unlike the Conservative party, which vacillated among
convention, caucus and other procedures for leadership
selection, the Liberal party remained faithful to the
convention method.

In 1948, Louis St. Laurent was selected

from among three candidates to occupy the leadership.

Both

Mr. St. Laurent and L. B. Pearson, who won a virtual twocandidate race in August, 1958, were victorious on the first
convention ballot.

The selection of Pierre Elliott Trudeau

in June of 1968 on the fourth ballot was the final occasion
to date (April, 1971) at which the party convention was
called upon to choose a party leader.

Needless to say,

the national party convention has been and remains the
established mechanism for party leadership selection.
The period subsequent to 1919 is also significant
for the Liberal party as it has maintained a relatively
consolidated position in respect to the Canadian political
and social systems.

One can maintain that the collapse of

the Unionist era ushered in a realignment of the Canadian
party systen, whose essential features have persisted from
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1919 to the present.

Thus, the party system has been

dominated by the existence of two grand omnibus parties Liberal and Conservative - whose ascendancy has been periodic
ally qualified by third and fourth "splinter" parties.^

The

federal Liberal party has consequently maintained a generally
stable position in relation to other parties and to the
social foundations of the party

system.

This stable

position has included the virtual dominance of the Liberals
as a governing party.

In only 11 of the 50 years from 1919

to 1968, has the Liberal party failed to form a government
at the federal level,^
Over much

of the period from 1919 to 1968, leader

ship in the Liberal party has been notoriously stable and
generally restrained in style.

Flamboyance and instability

of leadership, characteristic of the Canadian Conservative
party, has been notably absent in the Liberal case.

Only

four leaders, as opposed to more than twice that number with
the Conservatives, have existed in the Liberal party since
1919,

Moreover, there has occurred only

infrequent

^See j, R. Mallory, "The Structure of Canadian Politics"
in T h o r b u m . op. cit.. pp. 24-32,
&For details of ministries from 1919 to 1968, see P. G.
Normandin, ed., The Canadian Parliamentary Guide. 1968 (Ottawa:
Queen*s Printer, 1969), p. 21,
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challenges from followers to the continued tenure of Liberal
leaders.

Mackenzie King himself functioned as party leader

for almost 30 years.

Indeed, the dominance of Mr. King

since 1919 has been viewed as the paragon of Canadian
political leadership, according to the "brokerage" conception
of the country* s party and social systems.

This passive

form of leadership style has been most succinctly expressed
by J, W. Pickersgill*s observation:
He was acutely conscious that political
progress was possible only if public
support was forthcoming, and he believed
that nothing was so likely to set back a
good cause as premature action. 8
The low-key leadership perfected by King after 1919 differed
from the more principled or doctrinaire form characteristic
of other leadership styles.^

^F. H. Underhill was a prime ezgonent of the virtues of
"brokerage" leadership - the conciliation of many diverse
demands: "The essential task of Canadian statesmanship is to
discover the terms on which as many as possible of the
significant interest groups can be induced to work together in
a common policy...Mr. King’s life has been devoted to the
restoration of a working national harmony of the two national
communities (French and English) through a revived Liberal
party". F. H. Underhill, In Search of Canadian Liberalism.
(Toronto: Macmillan, 196077 PP* 127-129.
®J. W. Pickersgill, ed.. The Mackenzie King Record:
I. 1939-1944. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, I960) p.10.
^Former Liberal leader, Alexander Mackenzie, illustrated
this form of leadership style, emphasizing principle rather
than a more opportunistic approach: "My notion of the public
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In the same manner, the leadership style of both Mr.
St. Laurent and Mr. Pearson has been seen as relatively
restrained and uncontroversial.

Rather than as an innovator,

Mr. St. Laurent was viewed as "an executor or liquidator to
usher out the Mackenzie King era, not to usher in a new St.
Laurent era."^®

As one observer described Mr. Pearson’s

approach to leadership:
Reacting magnificently was always more
important than anticipating or reaching
out for problems...light on both feet,
ready to move in any direction...he saw
power in Canadian society dispersed
among competing institutions that always
managed to balance each other, producing
"the national interest" by osmosis. 11
As a rule, leadership in the Liberal party has been relatively
passive rather than dynamic in character.

12

^man is that he should maintain sound principles,
advocate them honestly, and trust to such principles working
out a right solution. The Conservatives have had a lease of
power, but they have had it by means no honest man can justify."
A. Mackenzie, quoted in W. Buckingham and G. W. Ross, The
Honourable Alexander Mackenzie: His Life and Times. (Toronto:
Ross, 1892) p. 425. Significantly, Mackenzie’s form of leader
ship coincided with a more doctrinal form of party. See S. P.
Regenstreif, "The Liberal Party: A. Political Analysis".
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1963) p.466,
^^Bggleston, Wilfred, "Appointing a Liquidator,
Saturday Night. August 14, 1948, p.4.
^iNewman, P. C., The Distemper of Our Times. (Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart, 1968) p. 54.
l^Admittedly, however. Prime Minister Trudeau appears
to be an exception to this pattern.
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Political Party And The Leadership Selection Process

The selection of leaders in the Liberal party can be
assumed to occur within two systems of behaviour^^

-

leadership selection process and the political party.

the
Although

other systems may have a marginal inpact, these two are the
most immediately related to the selection of party leaders.
The leadership selection process refers to behaviour
which relates directly to the emergence of party leadership.
The variables involved in the leadership selection process
of the party can be grouped for purposes of analysis into
three concepts

-

(1) the formal and informal structure of

the mechanism of selection

(2) the rules of the game applic

able to participant behaviour and

(3) the character of

"preselection" operating in the party.

The mechanism of

selection refers to the institution, in the case of the
Canadian Liberals - the national party convention, immediately
responsible for the choice of leader.

The patterns of

behaviour characteristic of elites and non-elites operating
within the leadership selection process as a whole constitute
the prevailing rules of the game.

Both the mechanism of

l^The concept of "system of behaviour" is derived from
David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis. (Englewood
Cliffs; Prentice-Hall, 1965Tpp. 23-34.
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8

selection and

rules of the game are primarily descriptive

concepts whose delineation in large measure indicates the
nature

of

the party selection process.

The character of preselection in the party is
indicated by those aspects descriptive of the leadership
selection process, but which do not stem from candidate
behaviour or from the structure of the mechanism of selection.
For exan^le, the number and characteristics of candidates
has profound influences on the form of leadership selection,
but is distinct from either candidate behaviour or the
convention structure.

Thus, preselection is indicative

of a more subtle, prior process in the leadership selection
process, which substantially determines its manifest
character.

Although less visible than the actual act of

selection, leadership also emerges in the context of the
wider performance of the institution as a whole, \diich
serves to project certain types of elites as potential leaders.
Leaders are always, covertly or overtly,
"preselected" by their supporters
according to the situational needs of the
group. Leadership is a nexus of need
fulfillments that binds situational
demands and group membership. 14

14Seligman, L. G., "Leadership; Political Aspects", in
The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. D. L. Sills,
(New York; The Free Press, 1968), p. 108,
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In effect, the concept of preselection allows analysis to
evaluate both the appearance and non-appearance of certain
forms of behaviour in the manifest choice of leader.
The second system of behaviour relevant to the
selection of leaders can be considered to coincide with the
political party itself.

Although other systems of behaviour,

(the political and social), may influence leadership
selection, the political party is assumed to be the system
most immediately linked with the selection process.

Since

its functions and objectives extend beyond that of providing
leadership for itself or for other s y s t e m s , t h e political
party must, however, be considered a more inclusive system
of behaviour than the leadership selection process.
The nature of the leadership selection process in the
Liberal party constitutes the dependent variable upon vÆiich

l^The analysis now considers problematic the fact that
leadership candidates reveal an inordinate bias toward certain
characteristics. Whereas, if behaviour and structure alone
were considered problematical, these characteristics would be
given. The argument is similar to that made against the study
of power exclusively using public issues as data. The essential
question is who or what sets the agenda prior to the mani
festation of a contest. See P. Bachrach and M.S. Baratz, "Two
Faces of Power" in Political Power, Community end Democracy,
ed. E. Keynes and D, M, Ricci (Chicago; Rand-McNally, 1970*) p.195.
IGpor a catalogue of other suggested functions of
parties, see John Meisel, "Recent Changes in Canadian Parties"
in Thorbum. op. cit.. pp. 33-34.
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this analysis focuses.

However, political party provides

the immediate environment in which the selection process
occurs.

As such, it is the main independent variable which

affects the nature of leadership selection.

The influences

of party derive from its two most basic features
structure and party ideology.

-

party

The ideology and structure

of

a political party provide the value and institutional
environment within which the leadership selection process
operates.

Diagram

1

Political Party And The Leadership Selection Process

Political Party (Environment)
Leadership Selection Process
Party
Structure

Party

Preselection
Rules of the Game

Selection
Mechani sm

Ideology

Political Party(Environment)
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Party
Leadership

11

Consensus and Conflict in Leadership Selection

In analyzing the nature of leadership selection, the
most central problem revolves around the manner in which
conflict arising over the pursuit of the office of leader is
reconciled with the consensus required for further collective
action.
In a theoretical sense, the question of the relation
ship of consensus to conflict with respect to the selection
of leaders by the Canadian Liberals is most interesting.

The

Parliamentary nature of the Canadian governmental structure
puts a priority on party consensus permitting unified,
collective action; but the conplexity of Canadian political
cleavages end omnibus nature of the major parties makes the
achievement of this consensus a delicate task.

Nonetheless,

the performance of the Liberal party since 1919 has clearly
resolved this problem in favour of consensus and, consequently,
of party success.

17

In the light of this overall capability

it is significant to explore the resolution of the problem
in the context of one aspect of party activity-leadership
selection.

l^As well as preventing internal schisms, the party has
managed to attract political factions, such as the Progressives,
into the party. See W. L. Morton, The Progressive Party in
Canada. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950),
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Two forms of conflict between political actors may
potentially arise in the process of leadership selection by
the party conventions.

The first involves the attempt by

non-elites to control directly the leadership of the political
party: the second features conflict between members of the
elite over the occupancy of the o f f i c e . T o the extent that
the latter process involves appeals for support to nonelites,^^ both forms of conflict allow non-elites a measure
of influence in the determination of party leadership.

In

this sense, both processes may be considered "democratic".
For a party to continue to function effectively,
however, both forms of democratic conflict must be

^^The first constitutes a demand for equality. Several
theorists have considered such demands for equality of control
to.be utopian. The only practical substitute is therefore
competition between elites for non-elite support, or "polyarchy".
Despite "the drive a^jay from equality of control in m o d e m
society...the democratic goal is still roughly and crudely
approximated in the sense that non-leaders escercise a relatively
high degree of control over leaders. The constellation of social
processes that make this possible we call polyarchy." R.A. Dahl
and Charles E. Lindblom Politics, Economics and Welfare. (New
York: Harper, 1953) p. 275. For purposes of this paper, elites
will be considered to consist of occupants of party or political
office at the federal or provincial, rather than constituency
level - for exanple, federal and provincial Parliamentary parties
and Cabinets and national officers of extra-Parliamentary
organizations.
l^According to S. S. Schattschneider, real conflict will
continually be expanded in scope by appeals for support. See S.S.
Schattschneider. The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist's View of
Democracy in America. (New York: Holt. Rinehaitand Winston,
r%ïï5

-------
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reconciled with the existence of an overriding consensus based
on the acceptance of wider objectives.

With respect to the

selection of leaders by the Liberal party, it is therefore
valuable to explore the degree to v;Æiich conflict of a democratic
sort has existed, the extent to wîiich conflict has been limited
by the presence of a party consensus, and the nature of this
consensus.

Moreover, it is consequently of great importance

to evaluate those instruments - the mechanism of selection
and the structure end ideology of the party

20

- which have

regulated the amount of consensus and conflict appearing in
the leadership selection process.

The resolution of conflict

and the establishment of consensus constitute the primary
focus for the analysis of the leadership selection process in
the Canadian Liberal party.

^^The confinement of causes of the degree of consensus
or conflict in leadership selection to the nature of the
Liberal Party and the structure of the leadership convention
obviously discounts the role of other influences. Due to the
historical nature of the study, for instance, the influence
of secular cultural trends should not be ignored. However, to
the degree such wider influences are significant, it is
assumed they will be reflected in changes in the variables
considered. For example, if a trend toward a more democratic
political culture has existed in Canada from 1919 to 1968,
there seems reason to assume it will be reflected in the
party itself or in the structure of the convention. Indeed,
there is evidence that such changes have occurred in the
latter institutions, accounting perhaps for a cultural trend.
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CHAPTER II

THE NATIONAL PARTY CONVENTION AND LEADERSHIP SELECTION

The selection of party leaders by national convention
is not characteristic of many political systems.

In the

United States, however, this procedure has been utilized for
the

selection of presidential nominees since the mid

nineteenth century.1

As presidential candidates these

nominees approached the status of leaders within the party,
although theoretically their leadership was not equivalent
to that exercised in the British form of governmental and
party system.

In this type of political system, prevailing

in the United Kingdom and the Dominions, the appointment of
party leaders remained under the control of parliamentary
figures operating within the legislative caucus.
The first exception to the caucus control of leader
ship in British Cabinet-Parliamentary systems was the 1893
convention of the Canadian Liberal Party.

Although conventions

^See V. 0. Key. Politics. Parties and Pressure Groups.
5th edition. (New York: Crowell, 1964) p. 397. For a history
of American conventions, see P. T. David, et. al., The Politics
of National Party Conventions (New York: Vintage, 1964).
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of Canadian parties occurred prior to 1893,

2

the 1893

gathering was the first convention to be widely representative

3

and to concern itself, albeit briefly, with the question of
party leadership.

Conpared to the American conventions of

the period and later Canadian conventions, however, the
leadership question was only a minor consideration in 1893.
Certainly there was no idea of deposing the reigning leader.
Sir Wilfrid Laurier, and, in the conduct of the convention,
priority was given to policy and organizational affairs.*
Indeed, the only official act of the convention in regards
to leadership was to present at the last session a "resolution
of confidence" in Laurier, which was hastily carried in the
early hours of the morning.^

2 The doctrinal predecessors of the Liberals, the Grits,
held the first "national" (1859) convention in Canada, See
Elwood P. Jones, "Ephemeral Conpromise: The Great Reform
Convention Revisited" Journal of Canadian Studies. Ill (February,
1968), 21 - 28, and G, W. Brown, **The Grit Party and the Great
Reform Convention of 1859" Canadian Historical Review. XXIV
(September, 1953), 245-265.
^See J. W. Lederle, "The National Organization of
Liberal and Conservative Parties in Canada". (Unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Michigan, 1942), p. 58.
^Indeed, the convention was so representative that
delegate credentials were often unchecked. See J. W. Lederle,
"The Liberal Convention of 1893" Canadian J o u m a l of Economics
and Political Science. XVI. (February, 1950), 46,
^The resolution stated; "That this convention desires
to express its entire confidence in the leadership of the
Honourable Wilfrid Laurier and its admiration of his brilliant
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In view of the characteristics of the 1893 convention,
the 1919 convention of the Liberal Party can be considered
the original prototype of national leadership conventions in
Canada.

Due to the death of Laurier and the unstable

nature of the party system following the Unionist period, the
convention of 1919 featured a serious struggle over the
succession to Laurier's leadership of the party.

Although

the questions of party organization and program as well as
leadership were the official purposes of the convention,^
the latter issue was, in reality, paramount.

In this sense

the 1919 convention patterned the succeeding conventions of
1948, 1958 and 1968.

Similar to 1919, the later conventions

all featured leadership contests between twro or more
candidates, which were decided by a majority ballot of
delegates.
Perhaps the most distinguishing characteristic of

^eloquence, his endearing personal qualities and his
broad and statesmanlike utterances upon the public questions
of the day." The Official Report of the Liberal Convention.
(Toronto; The Liberal Party of Canada 1893), p. 141.
^The Liberal Party of Canada. The National Liberal
Convention. Ottawa. August 5. 6. 7. 1919; The Story of the
Convention and The Report of its Proceedings. (Ottawa, 1919)
p. 6. Hereafter, referred to as The National Liberal
Convention. (1919).
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the history of contests, in contrast to their United States
counterparts, is their irregular occurrence.

Only four

leadership conventions have been held this century.

Between

these gatherings the minimum interval was a decade; but the
period between the King and St. Laurent conventions was
almost 29 years.
The party* s relationship to government has been
assumed to affect the conduct of national conventions.

In

the United States, whether a party is "in" or "out" of power
at the federal level has been considered a significant
influence on convention behaviour.?

1%^ the Canadian Liberal

Party only one leadership convention - 1948 - has been
conducted in a period

when the party actually possessed a

clear majority in the lower House,

In 1968, the government

of Mr. Pearson held only a plurality of the Commons* seats.
Both in 1919 and 1958, the party constituted the Official
Opposition at the federal level, although Liberal govern
ments were present in the provinces.®
7 See David, et. al., o£. cit.. pp. 82-125,
8 The number of Liberal governments in the provinces has
varied from a high of 6 in 1919 to a low of 2 in 1958. In 1948
and 1968 provincial Liberal parties formed the government or
participated in a governmental coalition in four provinces.
Liberal-Progressive governments were present in Manitoba in
both 1948 and 1958. See The Canadian Parli^entary Guide. 1919.
ed. E. J, Chambers (Ottawa: Mortimer, 1919) end P.' G. Norraandin,
ed. The Canadian Parliamentary Guides for 1948. 1958 and 1968.
(Ottawa; Queen* s Printer, 1948, 1958 and 1968.)
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The mere fact of being a Government or Opposition
Party has not been clearly related to the varying patterns
of conpetition in leadership contests.

The highest degrees

of conpetition, measured by the number of candidates and
ballots, have occurred in 1919 and 1968, while the lowest
Q
degrees were present in 1948 and 1958,
In the Liberal Party, more Clearly related to the
degree of leadership conpetition in convention were the
prevailing party outlooks on each occasion.

In this respect

a distinction can be made between the Opposition periods
of 1919 and 1958,

In the former case the party was

considered truly distant from the immediate possibility
of forming a federal government.

As well as having remained

in Opposition since 1911 and having suffered the defection
of the Liberal-Unionists,^® a realistic awareness of the
party* s position was prevalent within the party, as the

*See Table 1
lOAlthough possessing some 62 Quebec seats after the
1917 election, "Laurier" Liberals retained only 8 seats in
Ontario and a mere 2 in the four western provinces. Nonethe-less, the party received more than a third of the votes
cast in Ontario and Alberta and never less than 20% in the
other provinces. See H, G. Thorbum, ed.. Party Politics
in Canada. 2nd edition, (Scarborough; Prentice-Hall, 1967)
pp. 218-224,
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prospective leader, Mr. King, observed:
There seems to be a call to me at this time,
the need for leadership. It was never greater.
The party* s fortunes are at a low ebb, the
lowest for many years. 11
In retrospect, the Prime Minister confirmed and elaborated
upon this view:
...a party which had been out of office for
eight years; a party which had become
sharply divided at a time of vmr; a party
which had lost the great chieftain...; a
party which was in the minority in both
houses of Parliament. In its ranks, there
were still enmities and divisions. A third
political party,..was a rival of the Liberal
Party for power, 12
The 1958 situation was substantially different.
Although in Opposition after the 1957 general election, the
Liberals were only some 7 seats short of the government* s
total of 112 and had outpolled the Conservatives in terras of
popular votes - 41 percent to 39 percent.^®

As a result, the

llQuoted in R, M, Dawson, William Lyon Mackenzie King:
A Political Biography. 1874-1923 (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1958) p, 10,
^^King, W, L, M , , Address by the Right Honourable W, L,
Mackenzie King to the 1948 National Liberal Convention on Years
of Leadership - and Reasons for Retirement as Leader of the
Party. (Ottaîm: National Liberal Federation, 1948F T , 11,
ISstatistics found in the appendix to Thorbum,
op, cit,. p, 225,
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atmosphere of the convention proceedings differed consider-ably from 1919.

According to one observer of the gathering

...a casual bystander could be forgiven if he
concluded that he was attending the convention
of a party which had recently won, not lost,
a general election. 14
In his closing address as leader, Mr. Pearson accurately
portrayed the party optimism and its causes;
With the right policies and the right
organization we will soon be returned to
office again...Our task is to bring
confidence and stability out of the pre
sent confusion and uncertainty; to bring
back steadiness and faith where there is
now nervousness and fear...The Conservative
government is talking now of what they are
pleased to call a "pause" in our national
development.,.How long is it to be before
we get back on the Liberal road of full
employment and a rising standard of living,
the road this country has travelled ever
since the war? 15
Similarly, the party*s situation at the "government"
conventions of 1948 and 1968 can be distinguished.

As well

as possessing a vast majority of Parliamentary representation
and popular votes,

16

the Liberal Party in 1948 remained under

Ward, "The Liberals in Convention", in Thorbum,
op* cib'. P» 225.
15The Liberal Party of Canada. Report of the Proceedings
of the National Liberal Convention. (Ottawa; National Liberal
Federation, 1948) pp. 251-253. Henceforth to be referred to as
Report of the Proceedings (1948).
l®See Thorbum, o£. cit.. p. 225,
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the guidance of a leader who had occupied the post of
Prime Minister, uninterrupted, for 13 years.

The more

partisan challenge of the left-wing C.C.F. party had been
replaced in significance by the threat of international
communism.

Except for the protest of C. G. Power, a former

Minister, there seemed little evidence of dissatisfaction
with the prevailing status of the party.
In 1968, however, the Party formed only a slim
minority government, whose position was rendered even more
tenuous by the government defeat of February

19, 1968.

Electorally, the Party was challenged by the popularity of
the new Conservative leader, as interpreted by the public
opinion p o l l s , M o r e o v e r , among the established figures in
the party, no individual seemed adequate to bolster the
party's prospects.

Although Mr. Trudeau's attraction as a

candidate was his expected electoral appeal, he did not
represent an outstanding party figure as was Mr. St. Laurent
and Mr. Pearson on prior occasions.

As a result, in the 1968

situation of the Liberal Party, the "serene consensus", as

^^This was measured both in terms of the public* s view
of Stanfield as a leadership choice - 61% felt it was a "good"
choice - and the increased popularity of the Progressive
Conservatives as cougared to the Liberals - 43 to 34% in October
of 1967. See The Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, Public
Opinion News Service. (Toronto, October 25 and 28, 1967X1
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one writer has termed it, "that had so smoothly bestowed the
Liberal leadership on Lester Pearson (and on Louis St. Laurent
before him) was conspicuously absent."^®

The Structure of National Leadership Conventions
The leadership conventions of the Liberal party have
possessed a great similarity of structure, despite their
infrequent occurrence.

Although leadership succession has,

in reality, constituted the focus of the national conventions
from 1919 to 1968 (except 1966), only at the 1968 convention
did it represent the sole official purpose for the event.
The former three conventions were called upon to entertain
organizational and platform considerations of the party, in
addition to deciding the contest for

l e a d

e r s h

i p

.

Therefore,

the necessity of leadership selection incidentally provided
the opportunity for a gathering of party membership to
discuss other party

i s

s

u

e

s

.

However, the selection of a

party leader has constituted the real basis for the appearance

1®P. C. Newman, The Distemper of Our Times. (Toronto;
McClelland and Stewart, 1969), p. 436. As shall be noted below,
this previous ’’consensus" was primarily fostered by the
Cabinet elite or past leader.
19See Report of the Proceedings of the National Liberal
Convention. (Ottawa; N.L.F. 1958) p. 1.8; Report of the
Proceedings of the National Liberal Convention (1948). bp. clt..
p. 14; and The National Liberal Convention (1919). op. cit., p.6.
^^The long-time political organizer of the Liberal Party,
Senator "Chubby" Power, has asserted this advantage of party
conventions; "The greatest aid to part organization that comes
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of the national party convention.

The absence of any

additional national party conventions prior to 1960
illustrates this point and also the relatively low priority
given to "grass roots" determination of party organization
and platform once the question of leadership selection has
been settled.
The role of the national party convention in the
determination of party policy has been an indirect, minor one.
Although the leadership conventions from 1919 to 1958
simultaneously created a party platform, its lack of influence
on party policy has been defined by Mr. King*s statement at
the 1919 gathering:
I consider the platform as a chart to guide
me and with the advice of the best minds in
the Liberal Party as a compass, will seek to
steer the right course. 21

20from conventions arises from the opportunities for
personal contacts. The meeting of a large number of persons
actively engaged in the same kind of work, the acquaintances
formed, and, above all, the exchange of information and
experience, are of great value." Power, C. G., A Party
Politician: The Memoirs of Chubby Power, ed. Norman Ward.
(Toronto: Macmillan, 1966J p. 372. This opinion seems to be
concurred in by at least one analysis of the Canadian party
system: "This binding together of party activists, even at such
rare intervals, in the performance of a crucial function adds
significantly to party cohesion and facilitates the task of
party leadership." F. C. Engelmann and M. A. Schwartz, Political
Parties and the Canadian Social Structure. (Scarborough:
PrenticerHall, 1967), p. 192.
■^Quoted in S. P. Regenstreif, "The Liberal Party of
Canada: A Political Analysis". (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Cornell University, 1963), p. 207.
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The same philosophy was echoed by Mr. Pearson at the 1958
convention:
Our task is to bring confidence and stability
out of the present confusion and uncertainty;
...The chart to guide us in this task has been
established by the resolution you have adopted. 22
In the 1960*s, the frequency of conventions reviewing party
policies increased considerably.

Nonetheless, despite

desires among some activists that the party become "a vehicle
for dCTiocracy" the prerogatives of the parliamentary party
remained, according to Prime Minister Pearson, essentially
the same.

In speaking of the "freedom" present at the 1966

biennial policy conference, he announced
You have qmployed this freedom with a boldness and
a sense of responsibility that has renewed the
strength and vigour of our party. Your resolutions
will be significant end ia^ortant guides for
government (Translation)...The resolutions that
have been adopted will be our guide in the days
ahead. 23
Despite party assertions that the attitudes of the
present leader are somewhat different from his predecessors,

Report of the Proceedings (1958),

cit..

, p.251

23Proceedings of Plenary Sessions: National Meeting 1966
and Liberal Party Conference (Ottawa; N.L.F. , 1966) p. 47.
^^According to recent claims, the Liberal party is
increasingly committed to becoming "an effective participatory
vehicle" in which "iimroved participatory techniques...to make
more effective the role of the individual in all forms of
political organization" are to be implemented. See Liberal
Party of Canada. Study Group on Participation. The Politics of
Participation: A Progress Report. (Ottawa: National Liberal
Federation, 1970), pp. 2, 3 and 12.
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the relationship between party convention and ultimate party
policy, has remained consistent with the "cadre" nature of
the Liberal P a r t y . A t

the party policy convention of

1970, the "responsibility" of the party elite as government
took precedence over the in^lementation of members* resolutions
on policy issues.
Similar to the historic pattern of elite control of
policy determination in the party, the relationship of
leadership to conventions has also reflected the influence of
the Parliamentary party.

Since 1893, the structure and

occurrence of the leadership convention has not been determined
independent of the power of the parliamentary elite of the
party or of the perquisites of the party leader,

J. W. Lederle

25in other words, policy has remained a prerogative of
the elected party elites. According to Maurice Duverger, the
essence of the "cadre" party is its structure which resembles
"the grouping of notabilities for the preparation of
elections, conducting campaigns and maintaining contacts
with the candidates." Historically, the Liberal Party has
resembled this form of party structure. See M. Duverger,
Political Parties (London: Methuen, 1954) p. 64.
2®The present leader considered some resolutions
at the 1970 policy convention "for study" and for future
implementation, while the government "should consider ways and
means to study the balance of...resolutions." Letter from
Prime Minister Trudeau to Miss Denise Howe, made public by the
National Liberal Federation, p.3.
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has pointed out the rigorous framework imposed by the
parliamentary hierarchy on the conduct of the 1893
c o n v e n t i o n . A l t h o u g h the later conventions were more
"open" - in terms of increased representation and the pre
sence

of candidates - than the 1893 archetype, at no time

was the rule of parliamentary elites abrogated.

Thus, the

preparations for a second party convention were initiated
by Sir Wilfrid Laurier in 1 9 1 8 . In 1919, following Laurier*s
death, the parliamentary Liberal caucus appointed a "committee
of management" under the stewardship of James A. Robb, a
former Cabinet Minister, to conduct the affairs of the party,
including the provision of a national leadership convention.
Some 14 Liberal M.P.*s, including the House Leader, D, D.
Mackenzie, constituted this c o m m i t t e e . T h e actual establish
ment of the convention was under the supervision of a
National Liberal Convention Committee of 23 members.

The

committee was completely formed from Parliamentary elites
- 15 of which were federal M.P.* s or Senators appointed by the
House Leader and the remainder representatives of the
^^According to J. W. Lederle, "...in organizing the body
for business and subsequently in the discussing of policy
resolutions, the fine hand of the party leader and his cohorts
was omnipresent." Lederle, "The Liberal Convention of 1893",
op. cit., p. 50.
28&eport of the Proceedings (1948),
cit.. p. 2.
^^The Globe (Toronto). February 25, 1919.
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Parliamentary elite in 8 of the 9 provinces.
As the extra-parliamentary structure of the party
grew in significance, - witnessed by the creation of the
National Liberal Federation in 1932 - its participation in
the procedure leading to the leadership convention was
recognized.

Thus, a share in the responsibility for the

organization of the 1948, (and subsequent conventions),
rested with the National Liberal Federation and its
officers.

However, the essential control of the convention

remained within the Parliamentary party.

For instance, the

decision to call a leadership convention was synonomous
with Mr. King’s decision to retire, which was expressed to
a dinner of the National Executive Committee on January 20,
1948.

30

Moreover, the consultations of Prime Minister King

were basically confined to the elite of his Cabinet - St.
Laurent, Martin and Pearson - rather than extended to include
the party president, J. Gordon Fogo, or other extraparliamentary figures.

31

The leader’s initiative in prompting the calling of
a leadership convention remained characteristic of Mr. St.

^Qpeport of the Proceedings (1948), o£. cit.. p. 5,
31see Dale C. Thomson, Louis St. Laurent; Canadian.
(Toronto; Macmillan, 1967), p. 216.
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Laurent’s departure as leader in 1958.

The desire of the

former Prime Minister was communicated to the National

Liberal Federation’s President in September of 1957;
...I have come to the conclusion that I no
longer have the vigour and energy to lead
the party through a general election campaign
...Accordingly may I request you take the
necessary steps to organize a national
convention of our party at an appropriate place
and time. 32
As in 1948, final arrangements were the responsibility of a
joint committee of 10

-

5 representatives each from the
qo

parliamentary caucus and the Federation.

The actual

organization of the convention was further delegated to a
National Convention Committee and Convention Organization
Committee.

The latter committee’s 38 members were conq>osed

of some 18 Parliamentary figures, although the committee
was chaired by the Federation president, Duncan K. MacTavish.
In the former committee (45 members) were included 8 members
of provincial legislatures and 4 occupants of federal
Parliamentary seats.

A further subdivision into subcommittees

concluded the basic structures preparing the way for the
leadership convention.®^
®^Report of the Proceedings (1958), op. cit.. p. 15.
33lbid.. p. 17; and Proceedings (1948), op. cit.. p. 14.
3^Report of

the Proceedings (1958), op. cit.. pp.I.10-11,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

30

Despite the extensive machinery established prior
to the 1919, 1948 and 1958 conventions, the initiation of
this machinery remained the constitutional prerogative of
the Parliamentary leader.

The existence of this prerogative

was especially significant, given the possible status of
the party leader as head of government, and therefore as an
agent responsible to the populace at large
to the party.

rather than

In the traditional view of this situation

expressed by Duverger;
...democracy requires that parliamentary
representatives should take precedence
over party leaders (extra parliamentary)
and the members of the electorate over
the members of the party. 35
The recognition of this principle - to some extent - is
testified to by Prime Minister King*s comments on his calling
of the 1948 leadership convention;
I said nothing of the position of Prime
Minister I had the best of reason for
this. The office of Prime Minister is
not one in the gift of a political party.
It is the highest office in the gift of
the Crown...A Prime Minister is not
responsible to a party organization or
to a political party; he is responsible
to Parliament and through Parliament to
the people of the country as a whole. 36

®®Duverger, op. cit.. p. 182.
3®King, op. cit., p. 7.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

31

In this respect, the position of
1958 was quite different.

Mr. St. Laurent in

Due to the 1957 electoral defeat

of the Liberals, the leader did not possess the constitutional
or political prerogatives of the office of Prime Minister,
This was perhaps one reason for the appearance of pressures
urging Mr. St. Laurent*s retirement.®^
The context of Prime Minister Pearson* s retirement
from the party leadership also differed, in a constitutional
sense, from that of his predecessors.

The principle of party

gatherings at regular intervals for purposes of reviewing
party policy had been extended to the question of leadership
by a resolution carried at the 1966 policy conference and
adopted in the party constitution:
A resolution calling for a Leadership Convention
shall be placed automatically on the Agenda of
the Biennial Convention next following a Federal
General Election. If such resolution is adopted
by secret ballot the Executive Committee shall
call a Leadership Convention to take place
within one year. 38

3 7 % e day prior to the leader* s retirement the conference
of Ontario Young Liberals called for a federal leadership
convention. See G. Hamilton, "Young Liberals to Press for
Convention" The Globe and Mail (Toronto) September 6, 1957,
Ebqsectations of Mr. St. Laurent* s withdrawal had apparently
been present for some time. See The Globe and Mail (Toronto)
September 4, 1957 ,
The private pressures are described
by Thomson, op. cit.. p. 524.
33proceedingsof Plenary Sessions (1966), op. cit.. p. 12
and The Liberal Party of Canada. Constitution. (Ottawa, 1966),
Clause 9, Section H.
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Apparently, if the resolution was to be rigidly enforced as
part of the party constitution, the leader*s prerogatives on
the question of leadership succession would be substantially
reduced.
Events prior to Mr. Pearson* s retirement in 1968
allowed no application of the provisions of the 1966
resolution.

In practice, the withdrawal of Prime Minister

Pearson and his personal control of the initiation of a
leadership convention did not markedly differ from those of
his predecessors.

The ultimate decision, or authority, in

his retirement was the leader* s oim.

Prior to the day in

which his intending resignation was preferred to the public,
Mr. Pearson* s intentions were unknown to the Cabinet, National
Liberal Federation officials, and key political

a d v is o r s .

Certainly, political factors were no doubt involved in the
Prime Minister* s decision, including the appointment of a
new Conservative leader; but there was a conplete absence of
the overt political pressure applied in the case of the other
p a r t y , o r in the resignation of Mr. St. Laurent in 1958.
39see Donald Peacock, Journey to Power (Toronto:
Ryerson, 1968), pp. 110-111.
40see Martin Sullivan, Mandate *68. (Toronto: Doubleday,
1968) pp. 91-92, 121-130. For a biased, but more complete view
of the attacks on Mr. Diefenbaker*s leadership, see Robert C.
Coates, The i Night of the Knives. (Fredericton: Brunswick, 1968)
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The actual record of the national leadership
convention in the Liberal Party seems to differ in this
respect from conceptions of the process as an instrument of
intraparty democracy.

If democracy indicates control by

non-elites or even accountability of leader to non-elites
at specific designated intervals, the Liberal leadership
selection process has not functioned democratically.

In a

sense, however, the party convention has maintained an aura
of democratic legitimacy around the leadership of the party.
Apparently, Mackenzie King was prone to remind his Cabinet
colleagues of the wider nature of his party leadership
constituency,^^

Thus, the very fact that non-elites

participated in the selection of party leader, regardless of
elite control of the time and extent of this control, served
to democratize, (and hence in some respects to legitimize),
the party leadership process.

Delegates and Representation
The essential instrument for the delegate* s parti
cipation in the selection process is the leadership ballot.

^See D. V. Smiley, "The National Party Convention in
Canada: A Preliminary Analysis", Canadian Journal of Political
Science. I (March, 1968), 382; and Lederle~ *'The National
Organization...", op. cit.. p. 63.
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Paradoxically, the form of balloting - secret, individual
voting - utilized in Liberal Conventions, unlike the United
States* example, has encouraged a great degree of individual
free choice.

The individual delegate seemingly performed

as

a free agent, since he was bound by no primary elections
and, indeed, by no overt political "pressure" of any sort
due to the secret nature of the ballot.

If this had indeed

been practically as well as theoretically the case, the
relatively high degree of stability in the leadership voting
- 2 of 4 contests decided on the first ballot - is quite
exceptional,
The characteristics of delegates to Liberal leader
ship conventions are significant in view of this exceptional
stability.

The composition of delegates to Liberal leadership

conventions from 1919 to 1958 was such that Parliamentary
elites continually retained a substantial degree of parti
cipation in the conduct of leadership selection.

The actual

formulas providing for representation at leadership conventions
have thus been quite similar, being arranged:
Following the plans adopted in the prior
National Conventions...and having regard to
subsequent developments. 42

42Report of the Proceedings. (1958) and Report of the
Proceedings (1948), o£. cit.. p.I.8 and p. 14.
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Except for the inclusion of ten rather than nine
provinces and for the addition of the executive committee
of the Canadian University Liberal Federation, the formulas
for 1958 and 1948 were identical:
1.

All the Liberal members of the Privy
Council, of the Senate and of the House
of Commons, and where any constituency is
not now represented in Parliament by an
adherent of the Liberal Party, the Liberal
candidate defeated in the last general
election, or if a new Liberal candidate
has been nominated... such new candidate.

2.

The leaders of the Liberal Party in the
ten provinces of Canada.
All members of the Executive Committees of
of the National Liberal Federation of
Canada, the National Federation of Liberal
Women of Canada, and the Canadian University
Liberal Federation.

3.

4.

The presidents and two other officers of
each of the ten Provincial Liberal
associations; the Provincial organizations
of Liberal Women, the Provincial organ
izations of Young Liberals; and the president
and two other officers of each of the
university Liberal clubs in Canada.

5.

Three delegates from each federal electoral
district...In the case of Constituencies
having two Parliamentary representatives
six delegates will be selected.

6.

The Liberal members of each provincial
assembly and the defeated Liberal candiddates at the last provincial assembly
election in each province or new candidates
nominated, acting jointly, shall have the
right to select from among themselves a
number of delegates equal to one-fourth of
the total membership of each provincial
assembly. 43

^Report of the Proceedings (1958). op. cit:.. pp. 1.8-1,9
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The formulas consequently allowed Parliamentary elites to
maintain a high degree of participation in the leadership
conventions of 1948 and 1958.

In the former, 307 of 1,302

delegates and, in the latter, 351 of 1,534 delegates were
present members of, former members of, or candidates for,
the federal Parliament.

Another 140 in 1948 and 144 in 1958

were members of the Parliamentary elites of provincial parties.^4
Thus, in each of the leadership conventions of 1948 and 1958,
fully one-third of the delegate representation was attached
to the Parliamentary level of party activity as either
members or candidates.
The significance of the representational formula
resides in the preponderance of Parliamentary over non
par liamentary elites - officers of affiliated associations
above the constituency level.

The latter category constituted

less than 10 percent of the total representation at both the
1948 and 1958 conventions.

In 1919 this characteristic of

delegate representation was reinforced by confining the
participation of extra-Parliamentary heads of affiliated
associations to those of the nine provincial organizations.4®
44Report of the Proceedings (1958), pp. cit., p.I.16;
and Report~of thenFroceeHlngs (1948). op. cit., p. 25.
45see The National Liberal Convention, op. cit.. p. 6.
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Furthermore, the numbers of federal Parliamentary elites
qualified to attend the 1919 convention were extended to
include all those members "who desire to cooperate with the
Liberal Party", as well as Liberal members and defeated
46
candidates per se.
The signficance

of the legislative party at the

three earlier conventions clearly placed a high priority
on the goodwill of Parliamentary members for the achievement
of success by a leadership candidate.

In reality, the

successful leadership candidates have received a preponderant
amount of support from federal Parliamentary members.

How

ever, the significance of the Parliamentary elite in leader
ship selection extended beyond that of its numbers alone.
In particular, the behaviour of constituency delegates,
who have formed the majority of votes at each convention
since 1919, is not necessarily determined independent of
Parliamentary figures.

As Senator Power relates of the

process of selecting constituency delegates;
The weakness in this is that very often the
constituency delegates are the choice of
the federal member of Parliament and reflect
his views and vote as he directs. 47

National Liberal Convention, op. cit.. p. 6.
47power, op. cit., p. 371,
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The influence of the Parliamentary party over constituency
delegates derived from at least two factors - the method of
choosing constituency delegates and the relative lack of
information concerning leadership accruing to the nonParliamentary delegate.
The accreditation of constituency delegates
depended upon their election at a local party convention.
In each federal electoral district a meeting
shall be called...for the election by a
majority of the votes of those present at the
meeting, of the number of delegates to which
the constituency is entitled. 48
However, the responsibility for the organization of the
convention resided mainly with the respective federal M.P,
or defeated candidate.

Although the action of the defeated

candidate or member of Parliament was

undertaken in

conjunction with the local constituency and provincial
associations, the latter* s influence was clearly less direct.
The situation offered the opportunity of affecting the quality
of delegates much more to the federal Parliamentary members
or defeated candidates, than to other elite groups, such as
the extra-Parliamentary party or provincial organizations.
The impact of the legislative member on the views of
4®Pveport of the Proceedings (1948), op. cit.. p.16;
Report of the Proceedings (1958). op. cit.. p. 1.9. See also
The National Liberal Convention (1919), op. cit.. p. 7,
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constituency delegates was enhanced by his frequent monopoly
on political information.

In conventions prior to 1968, the

extent of candidate campaigns and the importance of the mass
media were much less pronounced than in contemporary politics
of leadership.

Furthermore, the knowledge of leadership

candidates and issues, as well as party affairs in general,
were often obscured in favour of enphasis on electoral
prospects and party unity.

In the convention of 1948 one

constituency delegate lamented;
We are here to prepare a platform.,.We don't
need pep talks. We want adequate time in which
to discuss what is going into that platform. 49
Party gatherings offered little opportunity for constituency
delegates to ascertain even the basic dynamics of the party.
According to Senator Power;
...the delegates usually return home with
little or no idea of the issues to be put
before the people of the country. 50
In view of this situation and of the nature of the constituency
party, which has tended to feature relatively little independent
presentation of information or discussion of issues, the status
of the legislator became particularly significant.

The member

49J. R, McLaren, quoted in "Delegates Want Good Platform,
Not Pep Talks", The Globe and Mail (Toronto) August 6, 1948.
30power, op. cit.. p. 370.
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of the Parliamentary party thus became a central focus for
the dissemination of information and opinion within the
constituency.

The actual extent to which the member has

functioned as an "opinion leader" among his respective
constituency delegates in the first three leadership
conventions is of course presently indeterminable.

However it

is not unreasonable to maintain that his potential influence on
delegate behaviour greatly exceeded that possessed by other
elites.
A change in representation at the 1968 leadership
convention favoured an increase in the number of constituency
delegates.
Six delegates from each federal electoral
district at least one of whom shall be a
Liberal woman and one a Young Liberal,
and alternates, who shall be elected at a
local meeting, to be called for that p u r p o s e . ^1
The relative decline of representation of Parliamentary elites
and the realignment of constituency boundaries in 1966 reducing the influence of Parliamentary members on constituency
members - has been seen as contributory to the more competitive
leadership contest in 1968.

However, the freedom of the

individual delegate is not necessarily proved by increased
competition, since the latter could equally well result
31Constitution. op. cit., Clause 9, Section D.8.
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from increased conflict between elites.

The significant

featiire of delegate representation at the 1968 convention,
as with its predecessors, was the commitment - through
prolonged party membership and occupancy of party offices -

52

of a great majority of delegates to the existing party frame
work.

The Role of the Party Leader
Although the power of non-elites in the leadership
selection process has been limited by the nature of delegate
representation to party conventions and by the lack of
leadership accountability at designated periods, a further
qualification was enforced by the nature of the elites
contesting for the possession of the party leadership.
Consequently, the effectiveness of non-elites in the conduct
of the political system is not necessarily measured by their
actual participation in elite roles but by the degree to
which their activity influences the award of elite roles to
different sets of conpetitive elites.

In the latter

situation, the existence of a clearly defined elite group or

32one survey of the 1968 convention reports over 50
percent of delegates were party members for at least 10 years.
See C. R. Santos, "Some Collective Characteristics of Delegates
to the 1968 Liberal Party Leadership Convention", Canadian
Journal of Political Science. Ill,(June, 1970), 301.
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a "counter elite" is a prerequisite of this influence.
In the leadership selection process of the Liberal
Party the success of a clearly defined "counter-elite" has
been infrequent.

As a result, there has not appeared a

serious discontinuity in leadership succession in the party.
This continuity in party leadership is evidenced by the
positive relationships established between past and present
leaders.

Moreover, the characteristics of leadership

candidates at conventions indicate a relative similarity
of elites - and therefore the absence of alternative or
dissimilar elites - in terms of their backgrounds in
political institutions,^^

Both these characteristics have

coincided with the absence of facilities, (the form of
balloting excluded), conducive to competition among alternative
elites for the support of non-elites, such as the frequent
use of pre-convention campaigns and of canpaign organizations
or the presentation of issues to the non-elites through the
promulgation of alternative platforms or philosophies.
The dominant contribution to the inpotence of "counter
elites" in the leadership selection process of the Liberal
Party has been the strong influence of the past leader,

53see Tables 2 to 4
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One source of this influence lias been the tendency of the
Liberal Party to venerate its great leaders - Laurier in 1919,
King and Laurier in 1948, and in 1958 St. Laurent as well.
As a symbol of the party and its success the party chief
was regarded xd.th deference by many party members.

In the

case of Mackenzie King, even the most dispassionate parti
cipant in the 1948 convention was not unaware of this
phenomenon;
We Liberals spoke of Mackenzie King with a
mixture of wonder and uneasiness, but
sparingly. He was less a person, more a
presence. To the Liberal Party he had become
a familiar mystery - like Communion wine - to
be seen, partaken of, believed in, never
fully understood; King conjured visions of
mystical powers, eternal triumph, and an
omnipotence beyond the ken of ordinary men
,,,one could end a conversation by beginning
to talk about him, 54
It is thus not unlikely that the considerable material
resources and political skills of the party leader were
enhanced by this prestige.
The significance of the former leader in the selection
of his successor was based on material as well as symbolic
considerations.

In remarking on Mr, King’s influence at the

^^Dalton Canp, Gentlemen. Players and Politicians,
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1970), p, 1,
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1948 leadership convention, a western journalist stressed
the considerable impact of the Prime Mini ster*s control of
elements of party patronage, including the occupation of
Senatorial posts.
These hopeful candidates for 13 vacancies
in the Upper Chamber point up an over
looked fact...The cardinal factor is that
the Right Honourable William Lyon Mackenzie
King is still the Prime Minister...Myone
who leaves Mr. King out of his calculations
has omitted the principal factor of
prophetical wisdom. 55
Although publicly uncommitted to any candidate, there seems
little reason to doubt the many reports that Prime Minister
King privately exerted his influence in favour of Mr. St.
Laurent’s candidacy.

The most obvious exanple was King’s

encouragement of Cabinet Ministers to enter initially the
nominations for the leadership and then to withdraw in
favour of St. Laurent.^^
Prime Minister* s

The fact that his tenure of the

office was not concluded immediately

after the choice of his successor, (similar to Prime
55"King Favours St. Laurent; Prospective Liberal
Senators Eye 13 Vacancies as Convention Nears", Winnipeg Free
Press, August 2, 1948.
56see M. King, The Mackenzie King Record; IV. 1947-1948.
ed. J, W. Pickersgill and D, F. Forster. (Toronto; University
of Toronto Press, 1970) p. 358, For further corroboration of
the extent of Mr. King’s intervention see Ibid,. pp.302-382;
Thomson, op, cit,. pp. 211-238; P., Vigeant, "La Nomination de
M, St, Laurent et 1’Imminence d’une Nouvelle Guerre," Iæ Devoir
August 5, 1948; W, Baldtd.n, "Concede St, Laurent Victory", The
Globe and Mail, August 6, 1948; and B, Hutchison, Mr, Prime
Minister, (Toronto; Longmans, 1964) p, 292,
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Minister Pearson), afforded Mr. King significant political
resources to exercise this type of influence.
The influence of the past leader in relation to the
choice of his successor was not confined to the 1948
situation, but was also present in the selection of the
remaining leaders.

In 1919, Mr. King utilized the veneration

accorded to the late leader, Wilfrid Laurier, by intimating
that his candidacy represented Laurier*s personal preference.
King* s speech at the convention extolling the virtues of the
late leader and his support of Laurier*s position during
the conscription crisis stressed Mr, King* s favourable
relationship with the past chieftain,^7
In the selection of Mr, Trudeau and Mr, Pearson,
the same overt emphasis on relationships with the past
leader was less evident.

However, in both of these cases,

the new leader, as a candidate, did not attempt to criticize
or to eschew identification with the former leader.
The converse of the above relationship consisted of
the role of the past leader in promoting the fortunes of a

^^For the actual relationship of Laurier to King* s
leadership ambitions, see F, A, McGregor, The Fall and Rise of
Mackenzie King: 1911-1919, (Toronto: Macmillan, 1962) pp. 311320 and H, S. Ferns and B. Ostry, The Age of Mackenzie King:
The Rise of the Leader, (London; Heinemann, 1955) 284-320, It
is problematic whether King represented Laurier* s true choice
as his successor.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

46

particular leadership candidate.

Certainly in 1958 and 1968,

evidence of the control which Mr, King was reported to have
exercized in Cabinet prior to the 1948 convention was lacking.
However, there appeared evidence in both exan^les of
successful candidates being particularly favoured by the
activities of the past leader.

In 1958, Mr,

Pearson was

not only politically associated with Prime Minister St,
Laurent; but had been encouraged in his political ambitions
by Mr, King himself before 1948.^8

Similar to the procedure

in 1948, when King consulted Ministers Howe and St, Laurent
prior to his decision to retire,^9 the final decision of
former Prime Minister St, Laurent to withdraw was occasioned
by a discussion with past Cabinet colleagues, including
Pearson and Lionel Chevrier,^®

In both instances, the

meetings reportedly considered the successor to the present
leader.

To Mr, St, Laurent, the assurance of Mr, Pearson*s

S^The party leader encouraged Mr, Pearson to resist
other offers and to pursue a career in Canadian domestic
politics, perhaps as leader himself. See The King Record, op,
cit,. p, 68; J. R, Beal, The Pearson Phenomena (Toronto;
Longmans, 1964) pp, 85-86; Hutchison, o£, cit,. p, 285; and
P. Vigeant, "Le Futur Cabinet St, Laurent", Le Devoir. A.ugust
10, 1948,
59see Hutchison, op. cit.. p, 292* Thomson, og, cit,.
pp, 211-212; and The Mackenzie King Record, op, cit,, pp,b8-b9.
60 See Thomson,
cit,. p. 524,
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decision to run in the leadership convention was apparently
a vital causal factor in his resignation.

The clear

association of Mr. St, Laurent and the leadership candidate
was further evidenced by his request that Pearson draft the
statement announcing the leader*s resignation,^^
The relationship of Prime Minister Pearson to the
candidacy of Mr, Trudeau suggests a further source of the
influence of the party leader in the leadership selection
process.

Thus, by enphasizing certain facets of the party

ideology, (the French-English Canadian partnership and the
principle of leadership alternation), Mr, Pearson tended to
favour a particular leadership candidate.

In announcing the

advent of a leadership convention and his retirement, the
Prime Minister pleaded the case of a bilingual governmental
and party leader;
,,,it is one of my secret hopes for Prime
Ministers of the future,..1 want them to be
given the privilege of exposure to the two
great mother languages of the western world
from cradle to grave. It TTill malce life a
lot easier,,,for future Prime Ministers, 62
The statement was a significant one in view of the fact that

the majority of established candidates - Sharp, Hellyer, and
81ggg Thomson, op, cit,. p, 524,
82Quoted in Peacock, op, cit,. p, 121.
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Winters - were less than fluently bilingual.

Although

External Affairs Minister Martin was bilingual, he was not
privy to the meeting of Mr. Pearson with possible FrenchCanàdian, bilingual leaders including Ministers Marchand and
Trudeau.

It was at this time that the leader encouraged

the candidacy of a representative of French Canada.^3
The degree to which this indirect promotion of Mr.
Trudeau’s candidacy xoas, in fact, a willful action of the
Prime Minister is, of course, problematical.

However, in a

negative sense, the Prime Minister apparently had reason
to prefer the Justice Minister.

A former Liberal Cabinet .

member has substantiated this view;
No one of us doubted, hox^ever, that he would
do everything he legitimately could to stop
Paul Martin, that he did not want to see
Hellyer succeed, and that he wasn’t as
enthusiastic about Mitchell Sharp's candid
ature as he had once been. I think he him
self would like to have supported Trudeau,
but felt that the young man was too much the
non-conformist ever to make it. 64
To some observers, the emphasis of Mr, Pearson on a FrenchCanadian candidate derived in some measure from his preference

G3See Sullivan, op, cit,. p. 274 and Peacock, o d , cit,.
, 222 for an account of these meetings, which included both
rudeau and Marchand,

Ç

84j. LaMarsh. Memoirs of a Bird in a Cilded Cage,
(Toronto; McClelland and Stewart, 19697 p, 357,
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for Mr, Trudeau,

Reportedly, this was the attitude of the

Prime Minister in respect to his discussions xd-th prominent
French-Canadian Liberals,
I was most anxious, likeexeryone else, that
Marchand should not feel that he x^as being
replaced by Trudeau as the French-speaking
candidate, 65
The actual delineation of the party leader’s
influence in regard to his successor is a difficult one,
Hoxflever, some pattern has emerged from 1919 to 1968,

This

pattern has reflected a high degree of coincidence betx^en
the reported or suspected preference of the party leader and
his successor selected by the party convention.

Moreover,

successors have hastened to associate themselves xfith the
preceding leadership and policies.

The presence of this

pattern suggests that the party leaders have possessed some
capability of performing a significant role in the deter
mination of the subsequent party leader.

More significantly,

the continuity witnessed betxfeen party leader and successor
indicates that successful intervention of counter-elites
attacking the prevailing leadership has been infrequent.

8^Quoted in Sullivan,

cit,. p, 273,
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The Leadership Campaign and Organization
In addition to the contribution of the past leader
in the minimization of inter-elite con^etition, analysis of
the leadership contests themselves indicates further the
relative absence of conflict.

An observation of Liberal

conventions reveals that conflict has been infrequent,%hot
only in a superficial sense due to the first ballot selections
of 1948 and 1958, but also due to the relative absence of
institutions or processes conducive to elite conpetition for
non-elite support.
Indicative of the low priority with which conpetition
between leadership candidates was regarded were the regulations
concerning speeches by candidates to convention delegates.
In 1919, leadership candidates were not allowed to present
public arguments in favour of their candidacies to the
assembly.

Instead, the only public presentations of candidates

concerned their roles in introducing platform resolutions of
various convention c o m m i t t e e s , I n 1948 and 1958, the
limitation on speeches was abandoned in favour of permission

G&King presented the motion on Labour and Industrial
Conditions, while Fielding introduced the resolution on
reciprocity. See J, C, Hopkins, ed,, Canadian A.nnual Review of
Public Affairs. 1919. (Toronto: Canadian Annual Review, 1920)
pp, 606-607, and The National Liberal Convention, (1919),
op, cit,. pp, 37, 126-146, and 156-162.
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for limited addresses by candidates to the entire body of
delegates.
A final procedure for the presentation of candidates
to the convention delegates was evolved in 1968,

As well

as general speeches by candidates, a series of "workshops"
established on the basis of general policy areas - "Our
Economy - Our World", "Our Life", and "Our Country" - were
available for delegate - candidate discussions. Despite
the relative informality of these latter occasions, they
did not provide a forum for intensive candidate debate.
The more controversial exchanges involved the conflict
between divergent views of constitutional problems possessed
by Ministers Trudeau and

T u r n e r ,

^7

A relative lack of

attention was focused on other areas,
The development of the above procedures indicates at
least a tendency toward the increasing establishment of
formal structures conducive to greater contact between
candidates and delegates.

The existence of this trend

illustrates perhaps that the formal institutions were becoming

87j, Saywell and P Stevens, "Parliament and Politics", in
The Canadian Annual Review, ed, J, Saywell, p, 24; J, Wearing,
"The Liberal Choice” , Journal of Canadian Studies. Ill, (May,
1968), 16,
88see Wearing, o£, cit.. p, 16,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

52

more hospitable to inter-elite competition.

At the same

time, it indicates, however, that competition of this sort
has not been an inherent assumption behind the historical
practice of the leadership selection process.

Previously,

formal convention structures had coincided with attitudes
deprecating the institution as a forum for extensive
elite conflict.
In addition to

little evidence of convention

institutions facilitating candidate competition, non
competitive patterns of activity have existed outside of the
formal framework of the convention itself.

In viewing the

pre-convention campaigns of candidates for the leadership
as one of these patterns of activity, the lack of elite
competition is quite apparent.

The activity and attitudes

of successful leadership candidates has been emblematic of
the historical insignificance of campaign organization in
the selection of the party leadership.

The archetype of the

ostensible lack of interest in personal campaigning was
Mackenzie King’s performance in 1919,

Generally considered

exemplary of King’s position in this matter was his visit
to the United Kingdom during the months prior to the
leadership convention.

The future Prime Minister recorded

at the time that his actions were a conscious policy on
his part:
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I had no organization of any kind and did not
seek the support of a single man, Mien spoken
to, I told my friends it was a matter for them
to consider and so as they might think best.
I literally abstained in every direction from
exerting any influence whatever. The trip to
England xms evidence of my desire not to
intrigue, and my attitude since my return was
not less visibly so, 69
The reluctance to intercede on one’s oxm behalf in
the form of a personal leadership campaign remained character
istic of King’s successor.

Despite the contrary efforts of

his chief opponent, Mr. St. Laurent refused to participate
in leadership campaigning or policy debate prior to the
convention.

To the External Affairs minister, a serious

candidacy did not require artificial stimulants of support,
I am not seeking the leadership,,,But I
believe that any member of the party whom
the convention selects would feel it an
honourable duty to accept, I am doing
nothing at all to influence the choice of
the party, 70
Officially, St, Laurent considered himself a candidate,
since he would accept the leadership, but he was not a
"running" candidate similar to Mr, Gardiner,
Similar to his predecessor, Mr. Pearson’s preparations
for the leadership convention were not characterized by
--

Quoted in Dawson, o£. cit.. p. 298,
^^Quoted in H, Hickey, "Gardiner Announces Candidacy",
The Globe and Mail. July 12, 1948,
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extensive personal campaigning.

Apparently, at lox^er levels

of the party, a struggle betxjeen sympathizers of Pearson,
Walter Harris, and Paul Martin had been present for some
months prior to the resignation of the party leader.
Significantly, however, the elite of the party did not
encourage this conflict.

The minimal level of personal

campaigning conducted by Mr, Martin, mainly consisting of
telephone calls and handshakes with arriving delegates, was
considered exceptional in terms of his opponent’s strategy,

72

The successful leadership candidate has also tended
to possess a limited campaign organization within the
convention itself.

As the archetype "machine politicians",

the unsuccessful candidacies of Gardiner, Graham, Fielding,
and Martin were more representative than the leaders them
selves,

In 1968, despite a general growth in attention to

campaign organization, it was Mr, Hellyer’s, rather than
Mr, Trudeau*s activities which represented the most
professional convention "machine",73
Candidates’ use of the leadership carpaign and
organization did increase significantly in 1968,
7^The Globe and Mail. September 4, 1957.
72xhe response of the Pearson camp to Martin’s activity
was W, Gordon’s encouragement of Keith Davey to "talk it up"
with party supporters of Pearson, See Beale, op^, cit,. pp, 140-142,
73see LaMarsh, op, cit,. p, 331,
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As one candidate lamented*
In business, xvhen you xyant a man for an
important job you turn to the man you xmnt
not the job seekers.,.I can’t recall other
leadership conventions in xi/hich the candidates
have been called upon to debate public issues
during the course of the campaign, 74
Country-wide campaigns contacting delegates and various
promotion techniques were undertaken by the major candidates.
The vast expenses incurred illustrate the attendit to mobilize
party membership in support of particular candidacies,73
Whether the increase in candidate competition
witnessed in 1968 can be considered permanent is subject to
further investigation.

However, even accepting this trend

as irreversible, the development of these structures
directed conpetition toward personal rather than policy or
ideological differences among candidates,7^

In this respect,

the 1968 contest resembled all previous leadership selections.
Only unsuccessful "pariah" candidates, such as J, G, Gardiner,
emphasized ideological divisions in leadership campaigns in
previous conventions.

Despite contenporary issues of consider

able inport, the 1968 Liberal candidates also did not engage

7^inters, Robert, quoted in Saywell, o£. cit,. p, 298,
75some candidates were estimated to have spent in excess
of 400,000 dollars. See K, Z, Paltiel, Political Party Financing
in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill 1970) pp, 39-40,
78professor Smiley observes that this is more functional
in terms of retaining party unity and leadership recognizes it
as such. See Smiley, og_. cit,. pp, 396-397,
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In extensive preconvention policy debate.

The early attempts

by candidates, not including Mr. Trudeau, to debate the Medi
care question were discontinued in response to the demands
of the party leader.77

The Leadership Convention and Party Conflict
The formal structure of the national leadership
convention did allow for a conpetitive leadership selection
process in the Liberal party.

Provisions were made for

competition between elites and for non-elite participation
by voting.

Despite the formal coirpetitive framework, however,

characteristics of the convention over much of its history
did tend to reduce conflict and encourage party consensus
over leadership - the substantial influence and represent
ation of Parliamentary elites; the absence of account
ability procedures or of rules stipulating the frequency of
leadership conventions; and the choice of a successor. How
ever, the most significant restraint on the appearance of
intraparty conflict consisted of the behaviour of the
political actors themselves.

There was relatively little

disposition among either elites or non-elites to utilize the

7?See Wearing, op, cit,. p, 15,
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convention as a forum for conflict over the party leader
ship,

As a result, informal practices conducive to elite

competition, such as leadership campaigns or policy debates
between candidates, did not appear xd.th great frequency.
the final analysis, the formal competitive framework
established by the national party convention did not
constitute a sufficient condition for the appearance of a
democratic leadership selection process.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

In

CHAPTER I I I

THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP CONVENTION AND PAJITY COHESION
Despite the establishment of the national party
convention as the mechanism for leadership selection in the
Liberal Party, the structure has not created a high degree
of conpetition among elites for the support of non-elites.
In this respect, the party leadership convention has not
functioned primarily as an instrument for accountability or
control of leaders by the general party membership.

In

this context it becomes necessary to explore the actual
function of the convention within the Liberal Party and with
regard to party leadership.

If the terminology of R, K,

Merton can be utilized, a "latent" function of the Party
leadership convention may be contrasted to its "manifest"
function of instituting non-elite control over party elites,^

^The treatment here of the leadership convention does
not represent an application of Merton’s paradigm for socio
logical analysis, Hoxvever it is useful to utilize his
distinction between ’’latent” and ’’manifest” ’’functions” . In
regard to the leadership convention therefore a basic analytic
difference can be maintained between "consequences" of the
institution "which are intended and recognized by the parti
cipants in the system" and "those xvhich are neither intended
nor recognized." See R. K. Merton, On Theoretical Sociology;
Five Essays Old and New. (New York:"The Free Fress^ 1967), p, 47.
The selection of leadership is "manifest" in respect to the
convention; its role in the promotion of party unity primarily
"latent".

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

59

It is useful to consider the extent to which any
mechanisms for the selection of party leaders actually
function as institutionalized control of elites by non
elites.

The mechanisms for the selection of party leaders

in many democratic systems are thus much less liable to be
judged prematurely as instruments for non-elite influence
over elites.

For instance, in the United Kingdom and other

British-type Parliamentary systems, excepting Canada, leader
ship selection has been the sole prerogative of the
Parliamentary caucus and, in some cases, has often been
restricted to an even smaller legislative group.

Such a

procedure remains operative in the British Labour Party
despite the prevailing democratic ethos characteristic of
this mass party.%
A traditional argument presented to explain absence
in certain democratic systems of leadership selection by
party conventions relies on evidence of dissimilar political
cultures and governmental types.

Thus, the selection of the

^Examples of the conduct of leadership selection in
British parties confirming these statements are found in R. T.
McKenzie. British Political Parties. (London; William
Heinemann, 1954) and G. W. Jones, *'The Prime Minister’s Power",
in European Political Processes, ed. H. S. Albinski and
L. K. Pettit, (Boston; Allyn and Bacon, 1968) p, 286,
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party leader by legislative caucus is seemingly consistent,
in the British case, with a form of government in which
executive leadership traditionally depends on legislative
approval rather than on a direct relationship with the
populace and vdLth a political culture emphasizing deference
to political elites rather than their control by non-elites.3
Correspondingly, the convention method is more suitable to
the "division of powers" concept of government in wrhich the
political executive is more directly linked to the populace
than the legislature and accords with political attitudes
enphasizing non-elite participation in the conduct of
political affairs.4
Neither political culture nor governmental structure
account fully for the applicability of the convention method
to Canada.

In addition to the disagreement on the extent to

% o r an argument of the deferent style characteristic
of the relationship betwreen British leaders and followers,
see Richard Rose, Politics in England. (Boston: Little, Brotvn,
1964) pp. 40-43.
^T. J. Lowi analyzes the nomination of U.S. Presidential
candidates by party conventions in terms of a relationship to
the separation of governmental poxters and to the increasing
democratization and decentralization of the party system. See
T. J. Loxd., "Party, Policy and Constitution in /merica" in
The American Party Systems: Stages of Political Development.
ed% W. D. Chambers and W. N, Burnham. iNexy York: Oxford
University Press, 1967), pp. 245-248.
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which Canadian political culture approaches the populistic,
American form,3 the suspicion of a basic incompatibility of
responsible government in the Cabinet system with the
selection of leaders by party convention exists.^

Nonetheless,

the national party convention has continued to provide the
political system with stable forms of leadership conducive to
maintenance of the political system.

Moreover, its function

as a stable mechanism for Liberal leadership selection has
coincided with a high degree of both party success and party
solidarity.

Clearly, then, the utility of the party

convention as a selection mechanism in the Canadian party
situation is not present solely for reasons of either political
culture or of governmental structure.
A more acceptable explanation for the suitability of
the national party convention derives from the nature of the
social and political environment to which a party system must
adapt.

Studying the party convention’s role in the United

States political system, a distinguished American scholar has
offered the observation:

5see S. M. Lipset, "Canada and the United States: A
Comparative ViexV, The Canadian Review of Sociology and
Anthropology. 1 (1964), 175-179.
6See D. V. Smiley, "The National Party Leadership
Convention in Canada: A Preliminary Analysis", Canadian J o u m a l
of Political Science.
(March, 1968), 382.
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The national convention represents the
solution by American parties of the problem
of uniting scattered points of political
leadership in support of candidates for
the Presidency and Vice Presidency, Thus it
is the basic element of the national party
apparatus,,.In a fairly real sense, the
national convention is the national party.
l-Jhen means develop for uniting people in
support of a nominee, the essence of party
comes into being...The national convention
thus is at the heart of the national party
system. 7
Professor Key’s analysis of the national convention recognizes
the decentralized, "constituent" nature of American parties
due to their performance as aggregators, within a federal
political system, of multitudinous demands emanating from a
diversified social structure.
In many respects the American party and societal
situation parallels the position of the Liberal Party in
Canada.

Thus, the existence of the national party convention

as the mechanism of leadership selection in the Liberal Party
can be viewed as consistent with a particular party response
to Canadian political and social conditions.
Studies have indicated that the development of
political parties and of their internal characteristics has
often coincided with changing characteristics of the social

^Key, V. 0., Politics. Parties and Pressure Groups,
(new York: T. Y. Crowell, 1964) pp. 396 and 431.
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structure or of other areas in the political system.

The

introduction of mass suffrage has thus generally influenced
the increasing bureaucratization and internal democratization
O

of political parties.
homogeneity

9

For reasons of relative social

or due to the party’s approach to electoral

s u c c e s s , t h e parliamentary caucus remained, despite mass
suffrage, the characteristic European form
selection.

of leadership

However, in the North American situation, national

political parties faced the further prospect of reconciling
a large degree of regional, ethnic and class diversity in
order to achieve governmental power.

Of particular significance

to the parties’ efforts was the influence .of regionalism, which

8see Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation" in From Max
Weber, ed. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1946), pp. 102-103. See also M. Duverger,
Political Parties (London: Methuen, 1959), pp. 223-228.
^According to some analysts, this was the dominant
factor shaping political development in the United Kingdom.
See J. Blondel, Voters/ Parties/ and Leaders: The Social Fabric
of British Politics (London: Penguin, 1963)7 PP* 21-26.
lOln many European parties, explicit identification
with certain social groupings or vTith particular ideologies
is more vital than the pursuit of governmental power through
pragmatic electoral means. A m o d e m example is the Italian
Christian Democrats. For the affect of this characteristic on
its leadership recruitment patterns, see Giovanni Sartori,
"European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism"
in Political Parties and Political Development. ed. J.
LaPalombara and M. Weiner. (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1966), pp. 143-144.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

64

was reinforced by the operation of a federal systen^^ and by
electoral systems which exaggerated regional representation
in legislatures.

12

The influence of these conditions of social diversity
became particularly acute to the Liberal Party in the

period

between 1887 - the selection of Sir Wilfrid Laurier by the
party caucus to succeed Edward Blake - and 1919, when the
first selection of a national leader was accomplished by
party convention.

The Canadian situation was endemically

more conplex than the American, due to the existence of the
province

of Quebec, which overlapped ethnic loyalties with

the regional identifications already encouraged by the federal

^Certainly the existence of a federal political
system facilitates the mobilization of regional demands and
their presentation to the central authority. Moreover, it has
been argued that the federal nature of a system may encourage
the persistence of opposition to the centralization of the
political systan after the initial social or political reasons
for opposition have declined. See T. J. Loxfi, o£. cit.. pp. 253254.
^^A concise argument of this hypothesis in reference
to the Canadian political system is found in A. C. Caims,
"The Electoral and Party Systems in Canada, 1929 - 1965".
Canadian J o u m a l of Political Science. I (March, 1968) passim.
See also Duverger, o^. cit.. pp7 216-228.
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and electoral structures of the country.13

However,

political and social developments, particularly the expansion
of immigration, economic growth, and the addition of new
provinces, had exacerbated the social diversity upon

which

the Canadian political system was based in 1919.
The most significant of these elements of diversity
in terms

of their effect on political movements was the

development of prairie agriculture and the expansion of
industry.

The expansion of these interests and their

mobilization due to the conditions of the World War I era^^
increased substantially the complexity of the Canadian
political system of 1919 in comparison to the nineteenth

The relationship of Quebec to the regional ethnic
and religious cleavages of the Canadian political system is a
significant one. Its creation of an "overlapping" pattern of
cleavages has considerable effect on the nature of the
Canadian party system. See R. R. Alford, Party and Society;
The Anglo-American Democracies (Chicago; Rand-McNally, 1963)
p. 260.
l^Two simultaneous movements dominated the Canadian
economic system in the early years of the twentieth century
prior to the 1920’s. The first witnessed the ejqiansion of the
western wheat economy which brought the prairie provinces into
the mainstream of Canadian political and economic activity. The
birth of the "nexv industrialism" and the growth of Canadian
manufacturing to an output equivalent to agriculture constituted
the second of these trends. See W. T. Easterbrook and H. G. J,
Aitken, Canadian Economic History (Toronto; Macmillan, 1965),
pp. 476-488; 515-522. The emergence of labour and agriculture as
significant political interests was the result of these economic
forces. See W. L. Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada.
(Toronto; University of Toronto Press, 195()), pp. 3^95, and Gad
Horowitz, Canadian Labour in Politics. (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1968), pp. 3ÏÏ-61.
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century.
period.

This was reflected in the election data of the
Although Parliamentary seats increased by just 20 to

235, the electorate expanded fourfold betxveen the elections
of 1887 and 1921 from less than a million to more than three
million voters.

The problems thus posed to the two major

parties at the national level were illustrated in the 1921
election results.

While the category "Other" received a

mere 1.6 percent of the vote in 1887, almost 6 percent of the
1921 electorate were recorded under this category.

Moreover,

this statistic does not include the 9.0 percent of 1921
voters who registered some disapproval of the prevailing
party system by voting for the

P ro g re s s iv e s .

13

The growth of socio-economic diversity coirplicated the
task of building a viable "national" party.

If this task is

construed as a process of distributing party output among the
claims or demands emanating from these interests, processes
such as the choice of party leader must appear to
cognizance of these danands.

take

Leadership selection in the

Liberal party since 1919 has been conducted in the context of
an overriding concern with building a national party from the

15See Howard Scarrow, Canada Votes; A Handbook of
Federal and Provincial Election Data %l4ew Orleans; Hauser Press,
1962),“pp. 21, 34-35.
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prevailing diversity of social groups*

The utility of the

mechanism of selection can therefore be measured by its
ability to contribute to the reconciliation of the demands
of these interests - in effect, to socialize potential
inner-party conflict over leadership.
A precondition of socialization of potential conflict
is participation.IG

Allowance of a sufficient degree of part

icipation through representation of demands is thus a vital
measure of the utility of a given selection mechanism.

In the

position of the Liberal party after World War I, due to the
proliferation of political and societal cleavages and the nuances
of the electoral system, the legislative caucus did not appear
to provide adequately for this representation.

The provision

of an institution more representative than the Parliamentary
p a r t y o f these social interests was therefore a necessity.
Although there seems little evidence of a direct causal link be
tween this situation and the provision of a national leadership

16See David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life.
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), pp. 236-238.
17q £ the total of 83 seats held by the Liberals only 20
were outside of Quebec. Moreover a mere two seats represented
the Liberal Party west of Ontario. This lack of representation
occurred despite the fact the Liberals never gained less than
20% of the total popular vote and only less than 25% in one
province, Manitoba. See H. G. Tliorbum, ed., Party Politics
in Canada, 2nd ed. (Scarborough; Prentice-Hall, 1967%
pp. 214-225.
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convention in 1919, the convention appears to have been
considered the most efficacious arrangement possible under
the circumstances.

R, M, Dawson does remark that:

...the convention would determine in large
measure how permanent was to be the dis
ruption of the Liberals, to what degree the
party could forget the animosities of the
conscription election and reach out and
meet some of the more recent movements
which were breaking do%vn traditional
loyalties and threatening the stability
of the old federal parties. 18
The convention alone seemed to provide adequate representation
to those forces - including. Liberal members of Parliament who
supported Laurier* s struggle against conscription, independent
Liberal members such as Fielding who supported the Unionist
cause but who after the war ivished to return to the Liberal
fold. Liberals involved in provincial politics who nonetheless
had harboured Unionist sympathies nationally, various extraparliamentary "Laurier" Liberals, and all those federal M.P.*s
who "desire to cooperate with the Liberal P a r t y " - necessary
to the regrouping of a national party.
The 1919 situation of the Liberal Party is of course

l^Dawson, R. M . , William Lyon Mackenzie King: A Political
Biography, 1874-1923 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1958), p. 298.
19por a complete account of the alignment of political
forces at the 1919 convention, see Dawson, o^. cit.. pp.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

69

merely an exceptional example of the unique contribution of
the convention to the support of a stable selection process.
However, in all its applications, the representational
formulas of Liberal leadership conventions were sufficient
to create a greater degree of participation than could the
Parliamentary caucus.

In an explicit form, the 1919 example

illustrates that the essence of the national party convention* s
role consisted in its ability to permit the overt participation
in the leadership selection process of a wide spectrum of
party activists, whose exclusion would have been detrimental
to party ambitions.

20

Although a precondition, mere participation is certainly
not a sufficient cause of the resolution of conflict within an
institution.

First of all, conflict must be confined within

reasonable boundaries by some form of preliminary consensus,
at least in order to legitimize the means rather than the
ends of the activity involved.

Moreover, within these

boundaries, an institution, through its structure and by the
behaviour of its participants, must be conducive to the
maintenance of this preliminary consensus.

2®The chief of these would in this case be electoral
success and party unity.
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In the case of the Canadian Liberal Party, a factor
contributing to the discouragement of convention conflict
and therefore encouraging a stable leadership selection
process has been the relatively high incidence at convention
periods of party electoral success and of optimistic out
looks toward party victory.

By encouraging the exhibition of

a high degree of internal party consensus, this has facilitated
the acceptance of the successful leadership candidate by its
participants.

Significantly, at a low ebb of party fortunes

(1919), the new leader’s succession was greeted with the
most scepticism, due in particular to the question of his
acceptability to western v o t e r s . I n contrast, during
periods of actual electoral success (1948, 1968) or of
expectant victory (1958) the party leader’s efficacy as a
vote-getter was relatively unimpugned.
The prevalence of electoral success or of optimistic
outlooks toward it at convention periods and, therefore, the
existence of inducements to party consensus relate directly
to the control over the occurrence of leadership conventions
vested in the person of the party leader.

Certainly such an

hypothesis cannot be applied in 1919, when the death of the
2 ^ n e of the sceptics was the influential editor of the
Free Press. J. W. Dafoe. See Ramsey Cook, The Politics of John
W. Dafoe and the Free Press (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1963), p. 106.
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past leader was involved.

However, in other situations,

the occurrence of a leadership convention was governed by
the discretion of the party leader instead of by specific
constitutional directives relating to leadership succession.
This was at least conducive to a greater control of the
electoral situation of the party at the time of the convention,
In contrast to formal rules regarding convention occurrence,
such as in the United States, which do not allow this control,
the flexibility of the Liberal situation has allowed elites
the opportunity to choose occasions conducive to an untroubled
transfer of leadership.

Although the exact extent to which

this consideration has entered into the calculations of
leaders cannot be ascertained, it is reasonable to expect
that leaders were not unaware of the degree and nature of
party consensus at the time of their decisions.
A high incidence of electoral success and the control
over the initiation of the leadership convention possessed
by the party leader has encouraged the probability of
consensus within the institution.

In the final analysis,

however, consensus within the national Liberal convention
was a function of a more central political process.

This

process was based on the congruence of the interests of the
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party elite and non-elite.

22

For the leadership convention to remain a contribution
to a stable selection process and to party unity, the
capability of reconciling the interests of party elites xd.th
the bulk of non-elite participants was essential.

In practice,

the leadership convention of the Liberal party has exhibited
this capability, since the desire of occupants of various
elite roles to control the selection of leader has been
consistent with the expectations of party non-elites.

The

basis for this reconciliation has ultimately rested in the
acceptance by non-elites, except for isolated, insignificant
i n s t a n c e s , o f the necessity of selecting party leaders from

^Difference of interest derive from the oligarchical
nature of party organization. See Robert Michels, Political
Parties; A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies
of M o d e m Democracy (New York; Hearst’s International Library,
1915), p. 32. A similar argument is developed in Duverger,
op. cit.. pp. 133-182. A further differentiation of party
roles is enforced by the responsibility of the party as govern
ment. Thus, Parliamentary elites retain their autonomy in
respect to the formation of public policy. See Duverger,
op. cit.. pp. 182-202; and also E. Eager, "The Paradox of
Power in the Saskatchewan C.C.F., 1944-1961", in The Political
Process in Canada, ed. J. H. Aitchison. (Toronto; University of
Toronto Press, 1963). For a discussion in relation to the
Canadian Liberal Party, see Chapter II, above.
2%Ir. L. Henderson is the sole exception. However,
his vote totals in 1958 and 1968 (1 and 0) testify to his
practical and analytical insignificance.
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the party elite.

The individual delegates who constituted

the convention non-elite were basically concerned with the
utilization of the ballot to choose between elites rather
than demanding non-elite control of the party leadership.
In effect, the former activity represented the maximum degree
of participation expected by occupants of non-elite roles.
Due to the structure and practice of the convention, however,
this degree of participation could be afforded non-elites
without necessarily reducing the potential influence of party
elites.
The basis for the lack of true control in the leader
ship convention possessed by non-elites has derived from the
factors elaborated earlier diminishing the significance of
the leadership ballot - the decreased influence of the
independent delegate due to lack of information and to the
effectiveness of Parliamentary elites as sources of information
and opinion; and the discouraging of viable alternative elites
by the avoidance of policy debates and information campaigns
by convention candidates.

As a result, control was largely

the prerogative of elite roles - the former leader, the
Cabinet and Parliamentary membership.

In this manner, elites

within the party were generally allowed to possess influence
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in relation to leadership selection corranensurate with their
party status.

24

The Regulation of Internal Party Conflict
The above analysis has suggested that a function of
the party leadership convention has been the promotion of
party unity and the furtherance of the party’s attenpt to
encompass a wide diversity of social interests.

As a

corollary, it has also maintained that the leadership
convention did not exist merely to provide for a democratic
choice of leaders within the traditional competitive model
of leadership selection.
In contrasting these functions of the institution,
the relationship of the leadership convention to internal
party conflict is revealed.

The party convention, despite

providing ostensibly for competition among

leadership

candidates, has also controlled rather than encouraged party
conflict.

Only in respect to the performance of the former

^^Explicit examples of informal practices of leadership
selection recognizing the inequality of individuals’ influence
occurred frequently. The informal meetings alluded to earlier
were somewhat exemplary in this respect. In 1948, Mr. King’s
consultation with C. D. Howe over the admissibility of Mr. St.
Laurent as party leader amounted to a virtual veto possessed
informally by a powerful party figure. See D. C. Thomson,
Louis St. Laurent; Canadian (Toronto: Macmillan, 1967), p. 211.
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service has the leadership convention invariably been
utilized, since in reality elite competition has been
minimized.

The leadership convention in the Liberal Party

has thus resembled a "functional mechanism" as described by
the sociologist, Karl Mannheim.

25

In this respect the

convention is usefully regarded as an institution, possessing
a formula - in this case the balloting of delegates - which
legitimizes collective decisions in the absence of complete
agreement. , According to this conception, the essence of
the leadership convention has consisted in its ability to
regulate conflict over leadership in the interests of party
consensus.

25See Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and World, 1936), p. 23.
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CHAPTER IV

THE LEADERSHIP CANDIDATES

Despite provision for conflict, the formal and
informal structure of the leadership convention has not been
extensively utilized as a forum for conflict between party
elites or as an instrument of non-elite control of the party
leadership.

This feature of the leadership convention was

encouraged by the existence of rules of the game and by a
process of preselection which discouraged the appearance of
competitive candidates and behaviour.

The characteristics and

behaviour of leadership candidates indicate this form of
preselection and rules of the game prevailing In the selection
of Liberal leaders.

The Leadership Candidates: Characteristics
A significant feature of Liberal leadership candidates
has been their association with careers at the federal level
of government.

Of the 17 major candidates for the party

leadership from 1919 to 1968,1 only Mr. Kierans lacked

lAll candidates were considered serious or major ivith
the exception of L. Henderson in 1958 and 1968. Only candidates
who actually were nominated at the convention and remained
until the casting of the first ballot with one exception Mitchell Sharp.
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experience in federal politics.

The emphasis on careers at

the federal level of government was also evident in the
degree of initiation of future candidates directly into
politics at the federal level,

A mere four candidates, in

addition to Mr. Kierans, had held provincial political
office prior to their introduction into federal politics.
Two of these candidates - J. G. Gardiner and W. S. Fielding were leaders of provincial governments.

In all of these

cases, however, with the one exception of Mr. Kierans, the
federal careers of these individuals were quite extensive
prior to their attempt to gain the leadership.
The characteristics of candidates indicate the
inportance of possessing some experience in government
positions at this level, not only in terms of House of
Commons membership, but with respect to Cabinet posts as
well.

With the duly noted exception, all leadership candidates

previously possessed Parliamentary and Cabinet membership
at Ottawa.

Moreover, in 1919, Mr. King’s temporary lack of

a Commons seat was the only case of a candidate’s failure to
occupy a legislative position at the time of the selection of
a party leader.

2

^The Minister of Finance, Walter E. Harris, was
considered a prime contender for the party leadersnip - The
Globe and Mail (Toronto) September 4, 1957 - until his defeat
in the general election of 1957.
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TABLE 2: PERCENTAGES OF CANDIDATES WITH PEuVINCIAL OR
FEDERAL PANTY EXPERIENCE____________________________________

%
Provincial Office Holders

29,4

Federal Office Holders

94,1
N = 17

The general characteristics of leadership candidates
in the Liberal party differ in some degree from those of
their counterparts in other Canadian parties.

In this respect,

the propensity toward federal party careers of limited
duration was a particularly distinctive trait of Liberal
candidates.

Leaders and candidates of the Conservative

and New Democratic parties have been to a much greater extent
products of extensive provincial party service and of
prolonged careers as professional politicians.3
The characteristics differentiating Liberal leader
ship candidates from those in other Canadian parties are
3

The list of candidates x<rith extensive previous careers
in provincialpolitics seeking the leadership of the Conservatives
is extensive - Bracken, Diefenbaker, Drew, Roblin, Stanfield.
See Ruth M. Bell, "Conservative Party National Conventions,
1927-1956" (Unpublished M.A. thesis, Carleton University, 1965)
and D.-Peacock, Journey to Power (Toronto; Macmillan, 1968),
pp. 13-109. Furthermore, former Conservative leaders Bracken,
Drew, Diefenbaker and the present leader, Mr. Stanfield had at
least some experience in provincial politcs and also came from
areas other than the central provinces. See J. K. Johnson, ed.,
The Canadian Directory of Parliament 1867-1967. (Ottawa; Queen's
Printer, 1968), pp.459, 554-555 and 578. See also Peacock,
on, cit.. pp. 13-109.
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even more pronounced in the case of the party leaders.
Successful candidates for the leadership exhibited political
backgrounds distinguishing them, not only from the leaders
of other parties, but also from unsuccessful candidates
within the Liberal party.

Thus, successful and unsuccessful

Liberal candidates differed considerably in relation to
their background in provincial or federal politics, the
length of political and Parliamentary service, and the
quality and extent of executive experience.^

TABLE 3: PROVINCIAL, PARLIAMENTARY AND CABINET CAREERS OF
LEADERSHIP CANDIDATES
Leaders,
N=4
Average Years in
Elected Provincial
Office

Non-Leaders,
N=13

All Candidates
N=17

---

4.0

3.1

Average Years in
Federal Parliament

5.3

13.4

11.5

Average Years in
Federal Cabinet

4.8

6.9

6.4

The resolution of the process of leadership selection
in the Liberal party has been favourable to candidates who not
only identified with the federal political level, but also those

^See Tables 2 to 5.
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xfho possessed a limited tenure of Parliamentary and
Cabinet positions prior to their pursuit of the party
leadership.

The longest Parliamentary and Cabinet apprentice

ship of a Liberal leader was Mr. Pearson's, of 10 and 9 years
respectively.

The legislative experience of both Mr. Trudeau

and Mr. King extended less than 5 years, of which both spent
a considerable portion as Cabinet ministers.

Moreover,

infrequently did any eventual leader function as a private
M.P..

Of the four Liberal leaders, only Mr. Trudeau - from

1965 to 1967 - served as a government back-bencher.

All the

remaining leaders were co-opted directly into Cabinet
positions.3

^This C O - option was characteristic of Cabinet member
ship as a whole. A study of Cabinets from 1940 to 1960 has
shown 40% of ministers were appointed during their first
political (Parliamentary) term. See J. Porter, The Vertical
Mosaic. (Toronto; University of Toronto Press, 1965), p. 400.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

81
TABLE 4: CANDIDATES ACCORDING TO LENGTH OF FEDERAL POLITICAL
CAREERS PRIOR TO CANDIDACY
1-10
Leaders;

Non-Leaders

King
St. Laurent
Pearson
Trudeau
Greene
Sharp
Turner

10-20

—■Illi—
IM

Fielding
Graham
Mackenzie
Gardiner
Winters
Hellyer
MacEachen

20+

■
M
,

■,

Martin
Poxvter

Candidate Behaviour: The Regional Representative and the
Professional Politician
The predominance of federal careers and the limited
experience in formal political offices among eventual party
leaders was indicative of a sharp contrast bett^een
victorious leaders and defeated leadership candidates in the
Liberal party.

The failure of particular types of leadership

candidacies further exemplified the correspondence of degree
of success with certain candidate characteristics.

Thus, the

regional representative, who had gathered political experience
at the provincial level or xdio had developed a regional
constituency as a federal politician, and the professional.
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long-time politician,

fi

who had extensive political experience

as a legislative and Cabinet member prior to his leadership
candidacy, consistently failed to gain the leadership of the
Liberal party.

Three of these candidates - Fielding, D. D.

Mackenzie, and Allan MacEachen - represented the Maritimes;
the final regional candidate in this category, J. C. Cardiner,
was a westerner.

Of these candidates, the political back

ground of Mr. Gardiner in particular and his approach to the
question of party leadership clearly illustrated both the
regional nature of his candidacy and the difficulties of
this form of candidacy in respect to the selection of
Liberal leaders.
-i- *■Candidate

Province

.. ..._... .

Position

Fielding

Nova Scotia

Cabinet Minister

Graham

Ontario

Mackenzie

Nova Scotia

Cabinet Minister & Leader
Member of Legislative
Assembly

Gardiner

Saskatchewan

Premier & Leader

Kierans

Quebec

Cabinet Minister

In Porter* s terminology, the professional
represents "a professionalizing of political roles
individual devotes his life to politics and in the
develops a *love* for political institutions." See
op. cit.. pp. 405-406.

politician
where the
process
Porter,
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There can be little doubt of the explicit identification
of Gardiner* s political career with the interests of the western
prairie provinces end in particular with western agriculture, ,
His position as Premier of Saskatchewan from 1926 to 1929 and
his occupancy of the Agriculture portfolio in the Liberal
Cabinets of the King and St. Laurent governments were consistent
with a close relationship to these groups.
The character of Mr. Gardiner as a regional represent
ative was apparently contributory to his difficulties as a
leadership candidate.

The basis of this difficulty rested

with his excessive attachment to a particular faction of the
Liberal party and to a particular group in the Canadian
social system.

An accurate appraisal of the image which

resulted from this form of political behaviour has been
offered by a biographer;
the common currency of contemporary comment has
been that he is too much a politician and too
much the Westerner...Gardiner seems to have
been regarded by the rest of Canadians, and in
particular by those policy-molding parliamentary
figures, as exclusively and dominantly the
champion and favorite native son of the Prairie
provinces. 7

Benson, N. A., None of it Came Easy: The Story of James
Garfield Gardiner (Toronto: B u m s and MacEachem, 1955), pp. 9
and 217. For further examples, see M. King The Mackenzie King
Record: IV. 1947-1948. ed. J. W. Pickersgill and D. F. Forster.
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), pp. 125-126
and 332.
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In Parliament and Cabinet, the Minister’s extreme concern
xiTith the promotion of western interests thus often placed
him in opposition to contrary demands by other political
Q
figures and political groups.
As well as adhering to his representative function
within the context of Cabinet and Parliamentary activity,
Mr, Gardiner approached the contest for the party leadership
with a similar explicit identification to this particular
segment of the Liberal party.

Prior to the 1848 convention,

the Minister of Agriculture rms involved in a wide variety
of controversial issues relating to x-zestem interests.

In

March and April of 1948, Cabinet controversy over railway
freight rates and the nature of nexir wheat marketing legis
lation resulted in Gardiner’s association vTith the demands of
western farm interests.9

In contrast, his opponent was

concerned xd.th issues relating to external affairs, which x?ere

^The Minister was often said to have "taken care of"
the producers, xfhile others were disadvantaged. See The
Mackenzie King Record, op. cit., p. 332. In addition the
Minister refused to cooperate xvith the legislative committee,
chaired by Paul Martin, xc-hich xvas investigating excessive
prices. See The Globe and Mail (Toronto), May 11, 1948.
^Ibid.. Plarch 31, 1948; March 20, 1948; and May 8, 1948 .
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much less likely to provoke internal party c o n f l i c t . T h e
great difference in the issues confronted by the txTO leader
ship candidates xvas exemplified in policy speeches given by
both on May 8, 1948.

Unlike Mr. St. Laurent’s speech which

basically concerned the government’s policy against Communism,
Mr. Gardiner emphasized his stand in support of the unpopular
ban on Margarine.

11

The Agriculture Minister’s campaign for the leadership
culminated in his promulgation of a ten point platform.

The

platform was really an embodiment of western demands on the
federal government and on the central, industrial regions.
The familiar requests for the expansion of immigration,
export and transportation policies was coupled with the call
for the decentralization of industry and the development of
western resources.

12

AxS wrell as representing an unprecedented

action by a candidate for the Liberal leadership, the content
of the program once again clearly indicated Mr. Gardiner* s
character as a regional representative.
lOThe external affairs policy of the St. Laurent era
was based on a premise of a hostility to international
communism. As a result, there was little basis for partisan
debate.
l^The Globe and Mail (Toronto), May 9, 1948.
l^The Globe and Mail (Toronto), July 23, 1948.
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The regional basis of Gardiner’s candidacy was
reflected in wrhat support he did achieve.

The regional

criteria upon which his candidacy was evaluated was
illustrated by the leader of the Saskatchewan Liberals,
Walter Tucker, one of the few prominent public supporters of
Gardiner.

As his reason for voting he declared;

Agriculture is going to be faced xd.th diffi
culties in the future comparable to those of
the 30’s. A man who has x^orked for Agriculture
and xvho has worked to get markets for the
farmer all his life is going to be more helpful
as leader of the government in the times that
may come. I am not voting against anyone. I
have the greatest admiration for Mr. St. Laurent
and his ability as a statesman. I am voting
for Mr. Gardiner. 13
Similarly, the Alberta leader, J, J. Bowlen, indicated his
belief in the legitimacy of a regional candidate.
I am not one of those x-jho puts the West up
against the East, but this party must
recognize the needs of both West and East.
The voice of the West is not being heard
in Ottaxm. 14
Along xd.th the backing from these western leaders, the Gardiner
campaign was reinforced by elements of the Ontario Liberals,

13
Quoted in "Highlights at Liberal Convention Previexv",
in The Globe and Mail (Toronto), August 5, 1948.
14ibid.. p.5.
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who represented the rural x^ng of the Ontario party.
Despite the support he obtained from his oxm
constituency, Mr. Gardiner* s status as a regional candidate
clearly diminished his prospects of attaining the party
leadership.

The feuds prompted in the Liberal Cabinet by

the championing of causes unacceptable to his colleagues
resulted quite early in a "beat Gardiner" alliance among
prominent Liberals at the federal l e v e l . S u c h a situation
xms anticipated by the Liberal leader himself in assessing
the overall strength of Gardiner*s candidacy;
I imagine Gardiner has these txvo provinces
(Saskatchewan and Alberta) in hand. The fact
that the West is strongly Gardiner xd.ll
_
operate against him in the other p r o v i n c e s .
In addition, the promulgation of Gardiner* s platform offered
an opportunity for wider opposition to crystallize.

Thus, a

prominent Quebec newspaper attacked Gardiner* s platform as a

l^This faction x^as lead by Colin Campbell. Gardiner
and the rural xdng of the Ontario party had been associated with the
forces of the Liberal premier of the province, Mitchell H e p b u m
- an intense rival of Prime Minister King. See The Mackenzie
King Record.
^^Ibid.. pp. 352-353; The Globe and Mail (Toronto),
May 11, 1948. One reported statement from a member of the
Manitoba delegation maintained; "Garson xd.ll get pretty close
to unanimous support from the Manitoba delegation. We’re
frankly out to beat Gardiner," The Winnipeg Free Press,
July 5, 1948.
l^The Mackenzie King Record, op. cit.. p. 358.
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clear appeal to x^estern economic sentiment, which x;as
incompatible xdth the unifying function leadership should
perform.
Ce programme attente en effet a l’unité
nationale, a la souveraineté canadienne
et a l’influence française. 18
By reinforcing his image as a regional candidate, the
presentation of the platform, rather than mobilizing support,
actually facilitated the emergence of further opposition.
The emergence of this opposition contributed to Mr, Gardiner’ s
rather severe defeat at the leadership convention of 1948,
The inability of Mr. Gardiner to present a serious
threat to the ascendancy of Mr. St. Laurent corresponded to
the general failure of the regional candidate as a leader
ship aspirant in the Liberal party.

Two sources of this

general failure can be considered - the effect of differing
delegate strengths among regions and the prevalence of certain
rules of the game diminishing the legitimacy of parochial
appeals within the Liberal party.

On the first issue, the

disadvantages accruing to Mr. Gardiner from the inferiority
of his western and agricultural constituency in terms of
convention votes are quite evident.

Certainly a vast

TSpierre Vigeant, "Un ennemi a combattre; M. J. G.
Gardiner'’, Le Devoir. July 28, 1948.
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majority of delegates came from French Canada, industrial
areas, or the coastal provinces, whose interests xfcre
opposed or only marginally sympathetic to western or farmer
demands.
There is little evidence nonetheless that the
respective delegate strengths of regions at conventions
constitutes a sufficient condition for the bias against
regional representatives as leadership candidates.

On this

note, it is important to recognize that distortions in
delegate representation due to great electoral success in
particular regions have not been a primary factor in
Canadian conventions, as has been the case

in the United

S t a t e s , S i n c e constituency delegates remained constant
regardless of the success of the party in the constituency
and since both defeated and victorious federal candidates
were automatically delegates, there was no regional dis
tortion in this respect.

Admittedly, a region constituting

a substantial proportion of the Parliamentary party, such
as has been the case of the Quebec Liberals, would possess a
greater degree of influence than a region represented

by

See V. 0, Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups.
(Nex^ York: T, Y. Crox^rell, 1945), pp. 402-407. Similarly,
representation at N.D.P. conventions does create biases in
favour of particular regions.
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defeated candidates.

Hox^ever, in practice, this has been

partially countered by the provisions for representation of
provincial Parlianentary elites.

In the Liberal conventions

from 1948 to 1968, for instance, the provincial Liberal
parties in both Quebec end Ontario were

in minority positions

on

in the provincial legislatures^^ - reducing the representation
of these regions.

The feet therefore, that the formulas for

delegate representation did not reinforce regions, such as
Quebec, which possessed a larger share of the federal
Parliamentary party and that regional representation in
the federal legislative party did not often coincide with the
party’s control of the provincial legislature, diminished any
tendency toward a numerical preponderance of delegates from
a single region.
As no inordinate bias is forced on delegate represent
ation as a result of electoral success, it is difficult to
justify the difference in significance of regional candidates
between the Liberal and the Conservative parties on
of distortions of regional delegate strength.

the basis

Despite the

lack of distortion, it is true that the central provinces of

2®There is however strength to the argument that the
western provinces, especially Alberta end British Columbia
which have been dominated by third party regimes, have been
thereby disadvantaged in terms of delegate strength.
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Ontario and Quebec,

1£ united, retained a virtual veto over

potential coalitions based on the peripheral regions.

Hox^-

ever, there has been no indication that such monolithic unity
has been characteristic of the delegates from central Canada.
In varying degrees, significant divisions of opinion on the
choice of leader x^ere present in the Ontario Liberal party at
all conventions and, to a lesser extent, in the Quebec party.
Certainly at no time

x^as there virtual unanimity among

delegates from central Canada as a xvhole.
The argument that a bias has existed against regional
candidates independent of the delegate strength apportioned
to regions is also reflected in the avoidance by the successful
candidates themselves, whose background and support was based
in central Canada,
xvith this region.

of explicit appeals to or identification
In fact. Liberal leaders received a large

amount of support of necessity from the central provinces,
especially Quebec.

Hox^ever, the leaders did not overtly

cultivate the interests represented by these areas, despite
the decisive number of delegates involved.

An attempt xms

made to appeal to all regions, at least in the form of a call
for national unity.

Tlie interest of the major 1968 candidates.

Z^The Gardiner-St. Laurent split in the Ontario party in
1948 is a fine example of such a difference of opinion in the
Ontario Liberals.
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including Trudeau, Sharp end Martin, to cultivate intensively
at great e3q>ense delegates outside of the central provinces
exemplified this concern for all regions of the country.
Although surreptitiously the successful leadership candidates
perhaps continued to be representatives of central Canadian
interests, the important fact remains that ostensibly they
adhered to a non-regional orientation.
overtly

Thus, these candidates

appealed to unity instead of to diversity and thereby

avoided the stigma of illegitimacy seemingly characteristic
of the more obvious regional candidate.
The conduct and result of Mr. Gardiner*s campaign
for the party leadership and the low frequency of candidates
either :fith significant careers in other than federal politics
or directly co-opted from provincial office, does not result
directly from differences in delegate representation.

Rather,

their lack of success illustrates the existence of rules of
the game governing leadership selection in the Liberal party
which discount the legitimacy of explicit appeals to regional
loyalty and to party diversity.

The illegitimacy accorded to

22see P. C. Newman, The Distemper of Our Times.
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, l9bu), pp. '439,~45r-456.
This situation is not readily attributable to a greater
division in the central provinces, since Mr. Trudeau, like
previous leaders, also had an equally strong foundation of
Quebec support and significant Ontario backing.
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appeals to

party diversity by the

rules of the game

complemented a party ideology valuing solidarity and consensus,
but was inconsistent m t h the applicability of conflict
between elites as a primary criterion of leadership selection.
The failure of

the regional representative as

a leadership

candidate was thus demonstrative of the priority of consensus
over conflict in respect to leadership selection in the
Liberal party.
Similar to the regional candidate, the professional
politician* s difficulties can be viewed as stemming from the
identification with particular interests which a prolonged
political career encouraged.

An identification td.th any

particular social interest, regional or otherxd.se, promoted
the image of a leadership candidate as a representative of a
parochial group rather than as a symbol of unity.

Thus, in

1919, Mr. Fielding was associated tdth the industrial interests
of central Canada, whose concerns centered around the
maintenance of a high protective tariff.

In the view of his

western opponents. Fielding represented a class and economic
philosophy in conplete contradiction to their oxm interests.

23

The former Finance Minister had always favoured a conservative
23 The Globe (Toronto), July 26, 1919.
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position on the tariff, maintaining its high level to prevent
’’interference of a serious character x-dth the business of the
country” . A c c o r d i n g to the loxv-tariff Liberals, Fielding’s
candidacy represented the attempt by the power of big industry
to control the leadership of the Liberal party.
The candidacy of the long time politician, being often
associated xdth a special interest, encouraged conflict and
polarization rather than consensus.

Referrring to the candidacy

of Fielding, which was already bitterly opposed on ethnic as
well as economic grounds, and his relationship to the tariff
conscious Canadian Association of Manufacturers, le Devoir
predicted a probable alliance against the former Unionist:
la situation se resume a une tentative d*
union entre l’Ouest, prétendu uni et contact,
et le Québec, aussi reconnu tel, pour purger
le parti de la direction suspecte qui
voudraient lui imposer des influences
extérieuses. 25
As xxrith regional interests, a candidate’ s affiliation xfith a
particular economic group constituted an invitation for
irréconciliable opposition to arise.

Thus, the strong

identification of Fielding xyith the high tariff, industrial

^Quoted in R. M. Dax\rson, William Lyon Mackenzie King:
A Political Biography. 1874-1923 (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1958), p. 392.
Z^Ernest Bilodeau, ’’Oliver contre Fielding” , Le Devoir.
July 31, 1919.
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interests served as a polarizing agent - similar to his
synpathies for the Unionist program - creating a situation
Inhere a substantial segment of the party was placed in
unavoidable opposition to his candidacy.
The candidacy of Mr. Martin presents a further,
perhaps more exemplary, case of the inability of professional
politicians to succeed in gaining the leadership of the
Liberal party.

In this case, the former Minister of Health

and Welfare had for some time been the prime exponent of
Liberal social welfare policies during the years prior to his
candidacy in 1958,

Despite the xd.de constituency to which

these policies were directed, Martin was obliged nonetheless
to engage in a great degree of internal party conflict to
guarantee their success.
Martin had to fight every step of the way
facing disagreement and doubt from Cabinet
colleagues...In Cabinet the chief stumbling
block xms the inevitable fear of costs, the
reluctance to enter upon nexv spending pro
grams. Louis St. Laurent was hesitant, C. D.
Howe unsympathetic. 26
The propensity to involvement in conflict of this variety
appeared to be the main risk incurred by long-time

politicians.

biased, overstated account perhaps, but nonetheless
somexvhat indicative of the conflict involved. J. B.Whealen,
Meet Paul Martin; A Personal Sketch (Winnipeg: Creywood, 1968)
pp. 58-59.
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such as Paul Martin, x^ho aspired for the party leadership.
Similar to Fielding,

the candidacy of Mr. Martin

invoked a polarization of party opinion, rather than a
consensus.

A prolonged Cabinet career and involvement in

domestic issues had resulted in the appearance of party
elites, such as Walter Harris and C. D. Hox^e, who for
personal or ideological reasons severely opposed the Martin
candidacy.27

The polarization provoked by Mr. Martin* s

candidacy contrasted vdth that of his opponent, Mr. Pearson,
whose previous political background xms unconnected to
partisan controversy of this sort.
The essence of the difficulties faced by the
candidacies of long-time politicians, such as Fielding and
Martin, rested in the tendency to create a polarization of
party opinion in respect to their candidacy.

The exact nature

of the elements constituting this polarization varied, but
it consistently involved the creation of substantial portions
of the party whose primary interest in relation to the
candidacy xvas negative.

In the case of Mr. Fielding the

Quebec and low tariff Liberals xvere in unalterable opposition;
the conservative segments of the party had long been alienated

27xhese difficulties are mentioned in D. C. Thomson,
Louis St. Laurent: Canadian . (Toronto: Macmillan, 1967)
p. 523.
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by the rigour of Hr. Martin in the pursuit of increasing
social welfare policies; and Mr. Gardiner* s paternal
relationship to agriculture was resented by the more
sophisticated eastern politicians in the Liberal party.

In

all of these instances, of course, the candidate reaped some
support from the core of his constituency within the party.
However, the success of this candidacy remained inconsistent
with the nature of the party*s leadership selection process.
The leadership candidacy of the professional
politician was usually considered to be a contradiction of the
expected approach to the selection of the party leader.

It

was such an expectation which prompted Prime Minister King to
distinguish the qualities of an individual such as Mr. St.
Laurent with those of politicians such as Gardiner and Martin:
I confess much of my thoughts through the day
were of the action of some of the men of our
party in xvhom I have been greatly disappointed.
Chief of all was Gardiner for entering the
race the xmy he did; trying to knife St. Laurent,
putting out little praises of himself, etc..
His sole emphasis on machine politics. No states
manlike outlook...Next I think was Martin. 28
The party leadership and its determination vms thus considered
a question of statesmanship - of conciliation end conpromise rather than a contribution to political conflict.

^%Iackenzie King Record, pp. cit.. p. 365.
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The rejection of the professional politician on the
basis of incompatibility with the form of leadership
prescribed by the prevailing rules of the game paralleled
the failure of the political machine as a campaign weapon.
The rigorous application of campaign organization did not
necessarily correspond to a high degree of success in the
leadership contest.

The most talented exponents of the

"machine" - Gardiner, Hellyer, Martin - did not seem to
gather great benefits from its use.

In fact, like the

professional politician himself, the utilization of the
political machine was inconsistent with the apparently
accepted form of leadership selection in the Liberal party.
In contrast to successful candidates, who expressed the idea
that the position of party leader would seek its occupant,
the machine politics of the professional served to indicate
an undesirable eagerness to seize the leadership.

The

political machine itself thus seemed to reject the assumption
that certain qualifications rather than mere political
opportunism should determine the party leadership.

As a

consequence, the exertion of machine politics in leadership
contests was liable to mobilize opposition, rather than
support, for the candidacy of its most vigorous proponent.
The bias contrary to the emergence of internal conflict,
which has characterized the rules of the game applying to
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leadership selection in the Liberal party, vTas also revealed
by the association of candidates* success xd-th certain
Cabinet portfolios,

TABLE 6:

29

PORTFOLIOS OCCUPIED BY LEADERSHIP CANDIDATES
Portfolios

C External
a Affairs
n
d

Finance

Justice

^ St.Laurent
g Pearson
f
L.
> Martin

Mackenzie® Fielding
St.Laurent Sharp
Winters^
Trudeau

e

Health
&
Welfare

Labour

Martin
MacEachen
Power
Turner^

King
Gardiner
MacEachen Greene

Agri
culture

'
a.
b.
c.

Solicitor General
Trade & Commerce
Consumer & Corporate Affairs

Portfolios are distributed according to the highest - in
terms of last - occupied prior to leadership convention. Candidates
appear txd.ce if they have been candidates at txfo separate
conventions (Martin) or if portfolios occupied at separate times
xfere considered relatively equal in status (St. Laurent,
MacEachen). Three candidates have been listed under a portfolio
which they did not occupy since the effect on candidate* s
association xdth internal conflict was approximately equal. Two
candidates are not listed who nonetheless received Cabinet
office (Hellyer - Defence; Graham - Railways and Canals).
Thus, the main channel used in the Cabinet careers of Liberal
leaders xyere the portfolios of Justice and External Affairs.
T h e s e were
9

Q

occupied by Mr. Trudeau and by Mr. Pearson respectively
'

"

" "

”

"

"

"

-

r

_

-

-

All information from Johnson, op. cit.
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through-out their careers as ministers, while Mr. St. Laurent
possessed both of these posts prior to his selection as
leader.

It is interesting to note the singular lack of

success of leadership candidates who devoted much of their
Cabinet careers to the portfolios of Agriculture, Health and
Welfare, and Finance.

Despite the political and technical

expertise these positions demand, they have not appeared to
constitute strong foundations for the pursuit of the party
leadership.

Especially notable in this respect is Finance,

which although held by some of the more illustrious figures
in Liberal party history - Fielding, Harris, and Sharp - has
never been occupied by an eventual party leader.
The poor leadership success of former Ministers of
departments such as Finance and Agriculture corresponds to
the bias in the leadership selection process of the Liberal
party contrary to candidates identified with particular
social interests.

The portfolios of Finance, /agriculture

and to some extent Health and Welfare have tended to develop
a constituency with respect to both the department and its
minister.

The development of this clientele relationship was

accompanied by the association of the minister with the
interests of his constituency.

The images of candidates such

as Gardiner, Fielding and Sharp were prime examples of this
process.
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The tendency tox/ard association with parochial
interests incumbent upon the Ministers of Finance and Agri
culture contrasted xfith the portfolios of Justice and
External Affairs in which such an outcome xjas improbable.
Due to the probability of conflict xfith other party elements,
the occupying of the former portfolios did not constitute a
favourable basis upon which to pursue the party leadership.
All Cabinet iMinisters x^ere concerned with the determination
of government policy and therefore liable to involvement in
internal conflict xTith other Cabinet members and party elites.
Howrever, the portfolios of Finance, Health and Welfare and
Agriculture not only favoured the association of the
minister xd.th a particular interest, but encouraged his
engagement in Cabinet conflict over the content of government
policy.

These ministries xvrere extremely vulnerable since

they xfere all vitally concerned x<rith the disposition of
scarce federal revenues for the pursuit of programs favourable
to one or another social group.
Medicare from 1966 to 1968;

30

The conflict concerning

the struggle between xvelfare and

development policies in the 1950* s; and the battle over consumer

As Minister of Finance, Sharp was in forefront of
opposition to Medicare from 1966 to 1968. See J. LaMarsh.
Memoirs of a Bird in a Gilded Cage (Toronto: McClelland and
Stexvart, 1969), pp. 338-344.
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and producer Interests prior to the 1948 convention,
represented conflicts occurring within the Liberal Cabinet
between these ministers.
A propensity to participation in internal party
conflict, deriving from association xjith certain social
groups, has accounted for the association of certain
ministerial positions \d.th lack of success in the selection
of Liberal leaders.

Only Mackenzie King of the Liberal

leaders selected in this century possessed a portfolio other
than that of External Affairs or Justice, which could be
considered associated xvith a specific constituency. Hox^ever,
even this one exception, due to the peculiar nature of the
Liberal party*s philosophy and historical position toward
l a b o u r , w a s not strictly comparable to those of Agriculture
and Finance.

In general, occupants of ministerial positions

conducive to the necessity of engagement in internal party
conflict were notably unsuccessful as leadership candidates.

The Party Reformer
The failures of the professional politician and of
the regional candidate were indicative of prevailing rules of
S^The King philosophy of labour relations stipulated
government*s impartial, objective role, identifying itself with
neither labour nor industry. See Dawson, op. cit., pp. 246-249
and also Chapter VI in this vTork.
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the game diminishing the legitimacy of internal party
conflict as a determining criterion of party leadership.
Another form of candidacy illustrating the loxy salience of
conflict in leadership selection consisted of the
unsuccessful attempts to encourage a division between elite
and ranlc-and-file within the party.

Although genuine

campaigns for party democratization by leadership candidates
have been a rarity, some use has been made by candidates of
strategies designed to mobilize non-elites behind their
candidacies as a challenge to the prevailing elite of the
party.
The candidacy of C. G. Power in 1948 represented the
most serious attempt to appeal to the rank-and-file rather
than to the party elite.

Although the leadership chances of

the former Cabinet Minister were at no time extensive, Mr.
Power’s candidacy represented a protest against the "bureau
cratization" of the Liberal party and a plea for a more
democratic party framework.
I never had anything like a glimmer of hope
that I would be successful; but I was coming
more and more to the conclusion that since I
had in the past three or four years, in the
House of Commons, in speeches, and in
magazine articles, protested against the
government’s method of procedure and continued
wartime controls, I could not at this time
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whitewash the past and give a blank
cheque for the future. This was the time,
X'/hen Liberals of all shades and degrees
were assembled, to set forth my views,
and if anyone wanted to vote for them
and for x;hat I considered to be the true
precepts of Liberalism, then I xmuld
give him an opportunity. 32
Nonetheless, the vote total accredited to Mr. Poxzer x;as
minimal.

The strength of the "protest" candidate and the

opportunity to register displeasure xvdth the Parliamentary
OO

elite of the party
concern of

did not appear as a significant

the bulk of convention delegates in 1948.

The Power candidacy clearly constituted, due to his
long concern over the issue and since the probability of
his attaining the leadership xvas alxmys minimal, the only
true "protest" against the prevailing structure of the party
in the four Liberal leadership conventions.

In later

situations, candidates such as Paul Martin and John Turner
attempted to precipitate a cleavage betxTcen elite and non
elite memberbship of the party.

Hoxvever, the motive in these

cases was to further the leadership prospects of the candidate,
rather than an exceptional concern for party reform.
32c. G. PoX‘7er, A Party Politician: The Memoirs of Chubby
Power, ed. Norman Ward. (Toronto':' Macmillan"" 1966), p. 1^6,
resigned from the Liberal Cabinet in 1944
and had not returned, which to a degree validated his appearance
in opposition to the party elite.
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The campaign of Mr..Martin in 1958 represented the
most overt attempt to mobilize delegate support on the basis
of an ostensible democratization of the party.

A statement

issued by the Martin campaign organization declared;
I knoxv and so does every delegate, that the
time has come when the people and not the
brass must be heard if the Liberal party
is going to come back to power...It is
evident that the Liberal party i s not*
beginning to speak from the bottom up
instead of the top doxm. 34
Predictably, the call for "democratization" xms not accompanied
by precise proposals for organizational reform of the party
structure.

According to the Martin campaign, an increase in

the poxver of non-elites xmuld be accomplished by supporting
the candidate x?ho differed x/ith the current arrogance of the
party establishment;
If the brass in the Liberal party feel that
this party can survive only by their dictates
as a closed corporation, telling delegates hoxv
they should think, then the time has come for
nex-7 leadership xzith an ear to the ground and
an eye to the future...If Mr. Martin is elected
leader he xrill fight for these (Liberal)
principles. He will also have the support of
the delegates x?ho are gathered here to see
that Liberal policies are once more dictated
by and for the people. 35

34j. y. Broxm, quoted in The Winnipeg Free Press,
January 15, 1958,

S^ibid.
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This technique complimented Mr. Martin’s position in
the leadership contest.

The overxvhelming support for Hr.

Pearson by the party elite had placed the former Health and
Welfare Minister in a position where the mobilization of
non-elites v/as a necessity.

Using the preponderance of

support for Mr. Pearson’s candidacy and the fact that the
party had recently suffered a setback at the polls, Mr.
Martin hoped to emphasize a conflict of interest between the
party as a whole and its prevailing elite and to present his
candidacy as the champion of the party rank-and-file.

In

fact, the strategy was adopted in all probability to
compensate for an already established situation - Mr.
Martin’s lack of support among prominent party figures.
Certainly Mr. Martin himself, as a long-time Cabinet Minister,
did not represent a plebian political cause and, ironically,
he was identified as much or more xTith the party electoral
difficulties in 1957 as was his o p p o n e n t . 3^

Nonetheless,

the Martin candidacy did represent an attempt to mobilize non
elites and utilize their support in challenging the established
party elites.

3^See Whealen. op. cit., p. 64, who admits that this
was a probable image of Martin in 1958,
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The attempt to associate front-running candidates,
X7ho had already gathered superior support from the elite of
the party, xvdLtli a party "establishment" and to further other
candidacies by identifying them with opposition to such an
elite group continued, although less eîsplicitly, in 1968,
Although a minor candidate, John Turner* s approach to the
leadership race stressed his unxzillingness to "make deals"
VTith the party "power brokers" as had the more successful
07

candidates.'"

Reportedly, the grouping of the Winters and

Hellyer forces prior to the final convention ballot xms
accompanied by an expressed desire to stop the party
"establishment".^^

As in 1958, the attacks v?ere directed

against the victorious candidate, xdio apparently possessed
the majority of Cabinet and Parliamentary support.
Despite its frequent appearance, the demand for
party reform or democratization did not appear to constitute
a particularly significant influence in the selection of
leaders by the Liberal party.

Neither the vote totals of

the protest candidate, Mr. Poxzer, nor of candidates such as
Paul Martin, xdio used their proclaimed opposition to the

37gee P. Stevens and John Sayxzell "Parliament and
Politics". Canadian Annual Rer/iexz for 1968 (Toronto: University
of Toronto ?ressTT9F9')T?.“25;
^
—
38See P. C. Nexman. The Distamper of Our Times, op. cit.,
p. 468.
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party elite as a campaign strategy, demonstrate extensive
concern with the problems thus posed.

The disappointing

results of attempts to mobilize non-elites in opposition to
party elites, combined with the fact that no candidate has
achieved the leadership of the party by an appeal to the
rank-and-file against

the interests of the party elite,

again indicates that leadership selection was not generally
interpreted as an instrument of party control of elites.
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CIÎ/.PTER V

THE PARTY LEADERS

.

The failures of certain candidates to achieve the
leadership of the Liberal party have revealed only one side
of the patterns of activity of candidates and only one aspect
of the rules of the game characteristic of the process of
party leadership selection.

The success of the party leaders

themselves also constitutes a valuable indication of the
nature of leadership selection in the Liberal Party.

Previous

analysis has shown the extent to which party leaders differed
from unsuccessful leadership candidates in terms of their
political background prior to selection.

Thus, leaders of the

Liberal Party have exhibited political careers which x/ere of
relatively shorter duration, as measured by membership in
Cabinet or Parliament, and xzhich xzere based entirely at the
federal level.^

The political careers of unsuccessful

candidates tended to be longer and more likely preceded
by provincial party experience.

Moreover, the careers of

unsuccessful leadership candidates were conducive to their

^See Tables 2 to 5 in Chapter IV.
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association xzith internal party conflict and resulted in the
usually vain attempt to introduce a competitive framexzork
into the issue of leadership selection.

In contrast to this

feature and corresponding to their political background, the
successful leadership candidates did not become identified
with serious internal party conflict and illustrated a
generally non-competitive approach to the selection of a
party leader.
The lack of association with factional conflict
characteristic of future party leaders derived from the
nature of their careers as members of the party elite.

The

Cabinet career of the Liberal leader was typically not only
extremely brief, but of such a character to place the
minister above the vicissitudes of Cabinet conflict.

In

the cases of St. Laurent and Pearson, the occupancy of the
External Affairs portfolio did not automatically engage them
in overt

conflict with Cabinet colleagues.

The practise,

during the later years of the King administration and in the
St. Laurent governments, of the leader's and Cabinet's
deferral of foreign policy to the special competence of the
minister^ contributed to consensus rather than argument on
2see J. R. Beal, The Pearson Phenomena. (Toronto:
Longmans, 1964), p. 89 and D. C. Thomson, Louis St. Laurent;
Canadian. (Toronto: Macmillan, 1967), p. 202.
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these issues.

Similarly, the Cabinet careers of Trudeau and
3
King xzere so extremely short as to make the opportunity for
severe personal or political animosity to arise extremely
improbable.

Even given the brevity of Cabinet activity,

there was nothing particularly controversial about their
tenure.

A colleague of Mr. Trudeau commented:
He did not seem to hold very informed views on
anything. He xvas, however, alx-zays vzell prepared
for discussions xzithin his oxzn portfolio and
skillful in xfinning support to his ideas...
Pierre Elliott Trudeau may have had some
feeling he was destined to be Prime Minister
...If so, he never displayed any such personal
conviction, end behaved for the most part in a
modest way. He xzasn't active in Cabinet and
wasn't often present....4

Similar to the pattern of other party leaders, the Cabinet
activity of Mr. Trudeau was devoted especially to the concerns
of his portfolio rather than to a wd.de range of policy issues.
The type of portfolio possessed by the leader previous
to his selection alloxved him to disengage to a great degree
from Cabinet conflict.

Since the policies articulated were

^The Cabinet careers of Trudeau and King xzere 12 and
28 months respectively. See P. G. Normandin, ed.. The Canadian
Parliamentary Guide. 1969. (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 196"^),
p. 281 and R. M. Dawson, William Lyon Mackenzie King; A
Political Biography, 1874-1923. (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, l958’)V
~
^LaMarsh, Judy. Memoirs of a Bird in a Gilded Cage.
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, l9'69')',"pp. l4'7-340.
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identified with no particular social group (Justice and
External Affairs) or required no extensive conscription of
government revenue (Labour under King), the portfolios
occupied by the leaders were not antagonistic to the
interests of colleagues.

Rather than a liability, lack of

partisanship and estrangement from domestic politics were
evidently an advantage to a Liberal leadership c a n d i d a t e . ^
Although unlikely to lead to a polarization of the
party elite, the issues subsumed under the jurisdiction of
the leader did give his candidacy a substantial degree of
public eminence.

The particular Cabinet office or issue -

area in which the successful candidate xms involved was
responsible for his attachment to an issue of national
importance immediately prior to the occasion of the leadership
convention.

In 1948, for instance, the candidacy of Mr. St.

Laurent xms boosted by the suitability of his personal
characteristics and career xzith the handling of the critical
international situation of the period.

As one delegate

remarked:
5

For experience of Liberal leaders, see Chapter IV,

above.
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I'm all for young fellcxm being given a
chance to do things and to go places,
mind you. But with this serious world
situation, I think the nexz man should
be someone xyith a good sound Icnoxzledge
of foreign affairs. 6
This attitude and reasoning was not untypical of other
elements in the party, including members of the Cabinet and
the Young Liberals.^
In much the same manner, the candidacy of Lester
Pearson in 1958 was undoubtedly favoured by his acceptance
of the Nobel Peace Prize a month prior to the leadership
convention.

The reported comment of a Cabinet colleague was

perhaps not dissimilar from the responses of other delegates
to the award:
l-Jhen a man gets that kind of play outside the
country, he's just too good to pass up at home.
We've got to like Mike. 8
To a lesser extent, comparable benefits were produced by
Mackenzie King's domination of the platform resolutions on

^Thomas McKercher, quoted in The Globe and Mail
(Toronto), August 3, 1948.
^Ibid.. August 3-4, 1948.
^Quoted in David MacDonald, "IRio Will Lead the
Liberals in the Campaigning to Come," The Globe Magazine.
January 4, 1948.
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Labour at the 1919 convention^ and by Hr. Trudeau’s defence
of Canadian federalism during the confrontation xvith Quebec
permier Daniel Johnson at the 1968 constitutional conference.
On the latter case, Judy LaMarsh has speculated:
As in his predecessor's case, so timing
(over x-zhich he had no control) wzas
responsible for the success of Pierre
Elliott Trudeau in 1968. For x^ithout a
chance roxz at a televised DominionProvincial conference, January 1968,
Pierre Elliott Trudeau xfould never have
captivated the public xzith his style. 10
Certainly Mr. Trudeau's remarkable progress in popularity polls,
xzhich shox\zed him rise from negligible recognition as a leader
ship prospect to the support of almost a third of the poll
xzithin the first three months of 1968^^ substantiates the
hypothesis that his activities as Minister of Justice during

^As a former Minister and Deputy Minister of Labour,
King vras chairman of the preconvention committee on labour
resolutions and chairman of the convention Capital and Labour
Committee. As such he introduced the policy resolution to the
convention - especially significant due to the absence of
provision for formal speeches by leadership candidates. See
Liberal Party of Canada. The National Liberal Convention,
(Ottaxza, 1919), pp. 126-146.
TOl^Marsh, op. cit.. p. 324.
Tljn December, 1967 Trudeau xzas one of several
candidates xvho together received mention by less that 3% of the
poll; in a poll published in April of 1968 he had 32% of
preference - 18% more than the popularity of his closest
opponent. See The Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, Public
Opinion News.Sheet: The Gallup Poll of Canada, Toronto,
December 2U, l9b7 and April 3, T9F5'.
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this period offered him ample opportunity to reach the
public eye.
The significance of these variables can be considered
to be greater than merely proving Hachiavelli's dictum that
"fortune is the ruler of half our actions, but that she allowrs
1n

the other half to be governed by us."

The intervention of

issues which aided the candidacies of Liberal leaders is
instructive regarding the selection process due to the nature
of the questions involved.

In the cases of the last three '

Liberal leaders, the problems confronted in their pre-convention
activity corresponded to responses to internal or external
threats to the nature of the Canadian state.

As a result,

their candidacy and Cabinet career represented the larger
interests of the Canadian whole rather than the demands of a
parochial group.

Thus, the candidacies of St. Laurent and

Trudeau x-zere linked with the recent battles against divisive
social forces lead by Premiers Duplessis and Johnson
respectively.

13

In addition, St. Laurent and his successor

xzere associated xzith the external role of the Canadian state.

Machiavelli, The Prince and the Discourses. (New
York: M o d e m Library, 1950), p. 91.
^ % r . St. Laurent had been active in the provincial
election canpaigns of both 1944 and 1948 against the Union
Nationale under Duplessis.
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Leadership, party and state were considered equally
instrumental in the defeat of the external threat.

Prior to

the national convention of 1948, St. Laurent proclaimed that
the "Liberal Party is still the only bulxizark against
socialism in Canada.

It tyas even necessary for Mr.

Martin in 1958 to record his concern with the priority of
Canada's external role by assuring his opponent the retention
of the External Affairs portfolio under his

l e a d e r s h i p .

The ability of successful candidates to identify
xd-th prevailing conceptions of the Canadian state in
relation to external and internal threats was reflected in
the delegate support received at the leadership convention.
In general, the party leaders vzere supported by elements of
the federal party, xzho xzere more prone to support the present
status of the federal system, and often opposed by provincial
parties, xyho xzere more likely to be innovators in opposition
to the federal status quo.

The Gouin - Lapointe controversy

over the Quebec delegation of 1919 constituted a struggle
betxzeen provincial and federal Liberal forces.

The conflict

was resolved by the assertion of Lapointe's jurisdiction in
^^Quoted in Warren Baldwin, "St. Laurent Leadership
Hope Slips", The Globe and Mail (Toronto), July 28, 1948.
ISgee The Globe and Mail (Toronto), January 8, 1958.
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federal matters and by the alignment behind the King
candidacy.
They (the Quebec delegation) met in caucus
- and actually turned Gouin doivn cold.
They told him...that he could run his own
Local Legislature, but that they would run
themselves in Dominion matters. 16
The role of the federal party in contributing to King*s
selection was also evidenced by the extent of Mr. Fielding* s
alliance with the bulk of provincial Liberal leaders,
The leader*s relationship to federal and provincial
parties followed a similar pattern in subsequent conventions.
In 1948, the King - St. Laurent axis included the overall
support of the federal Ontario Liberals in opposition to
the sympathies of the provincial party or "Hepburn gang" with
Agriculture Minister

G a r d i n e r .

There appeared again a split

in the Quebec Liberal delegation of 1968.

The overwhelming

majority of federal Liberals aligned behind the candidacy of
Mr, Trudeau, but the provincial party was not entirely in

^^Sir Allen Aylesworth, quoted in Dawson, o£. cit..
p.

308.

l^six of eight provincial premiers were reported to
have supported Fielding. See F. A. McGregor, The Fall and Rise
of Mackenzie King. 1911-1919. (Toronto: I4acmillan, 1962), p. 338.
ISsee M. King, The Mackenzie King Record; IV, 1947-1948.
J. W. Pickersgill, end D. F. Forster, ed., (Toronto;University
of Toronto Press, 1970), p. 353.
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favour of the federal Justice Minister.

19

In this respect,

the support given successful leadership candidates corresponded
to a response to challenges by regional or parochial interests
to influence or control the party leadership.
The nature of the candidacies of Liberal leaders
allowed them to be conceived of as unifying symbols opposed to
the forces of divisiveness and conflict with which the images
of their opponents were identified.

The support of the federal

party rather than of provincial parties manifested a commitment
to the Canadian whole rather than a particular region.

Similarly,

Liberal leaders were identified in opposition to any parochial
appeal, including those to social class as well as to regions.
Peter C. Newman*s appraisal of Mr. Trudeau illustrates the
non-class status of the Liberal leader:
Unhappy to classify him as a man of either the
political right or the political left, most of
Trudeau*s listeners seemed happy to regard him
simply as a man of the future. 20
The candidacy of Mr. Trudeau appeared above the partisan,
ideological struggles engaged in by his challengers.

l^The legislative party of the Quebec Liberals and leader
Jean Lesage were initially quite opposed. See Donald Peacock,
J o u m e y to Power. (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1968), pp. 262-263.
20peter C. Newman, The Distemper of our Times. (Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart, 1968), p. 456.
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There was no overt conservatism in the candidacy of
the Liberal leader, despite his avoidance of involvement
with particular groups or in polarizing issues.
element was suspected in all the Liberal leaders.

A dynamic
The

Trudeau candidacy, for instance, was considered to mean
...that national politics was passing through
one of its periodic upheavals when a non
partisan outsider moves in to reform and
recharge the system. 21
However, the dynamism or reform projected by leaders was
directed toward a reconciliation rather than toward a vested
interest.

In 1919, Mackenzie King retained the support of

the progressive western Liberals, due to the fact he was
"safe" on the tariff and liable to be less an outright enemy
than his opponent.

However, the King candidacy did not at

all identify itself \d.th the extreme demands of this faction
against other elements in the party.

22

The innovation to

which King, Trudeau and other leaders were linked did not tend

Newman, op. cit.. p. 457.
22xhe reason for Mackenzie King* s acceptability by the
west derived from the revision of the party platform toivard a
more moderate tariff; "We would much rather trust the tariff to
King than Mackenzie or Graham. The tariff is not as advanced as
the farmer*s platform, but it meets it more than half way."
Quoted from The Lethbridge Herald in The Globe, August 9, 1919.
Given its acceptance in the platform by the party, King could
be considered as at least less liable to reject the moderate tariff
idea than Fielding, who opposed the convention* s decision on the
tariff. See Dawson, op. cit.. p. 305.
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to alienate party factions, but attempted to submerge their
differences.

The successful Liberal leadership candidate

was not unassociated with the promise of change; however he
was unassociated xd.th change conducive to his identification
with party or social interests.

The Non-Competitiveness of Party Leaders
The association of successful leadership candidates
through their political careers and other characteristics
with issues and opinions of general rather than special
interest corresponded to the role their candidacy played in
leadership selection by the party.

The candidacy of the

eventual party leader represented a re-affirmation of unity
rather than an appeal for conflict with other elites.

As

such, the ability of leaders to substitute consensual for
competitive rules of the game has constituted the major
variable in the inapplicability of corrpetition between elites
as a determinant of leadership selection in the Liberal party.
The scope of con^etition cannot be separated from the
prevailing issues around which the competitive structure is
constructed.

Since the prevailing issue in the Liberal party

has appeared to be the necessity of party unity, the focus
of elite conflict has revolved around this concern.

The

successful candidates have been identified most thoroughly
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with the cause of unity: the defeated candidates usually
were linked to the forces of disunity and diversity.

The

candidacy of the party leader was able to associate itself
most clearly with the party battle against the challenge of
particular factions and of the internal conflict which they
provoked.
To promote unity instead of diversity necessitated
the articulation by the party leader of

an essentially

negative approach to the question of leadership selection.
In other words, the support of the successful candidate was
typically garnered from those elements of the party who had
previously been alienated by alternative candidates rather
than from the development of a positive program of his own.
The archetypal example of this occurrence was Mr. King’s
exploitation of the antagonisms developed in the party
against the Unionist cause.
What I would like to make clear is that it
seems to me that there was never any strong
sentiment in favour of King personally. He
simply represented the protest against
conscription and the protest of those who
wished to avenge Laurier. 23

23power, C. G., A Party Politician: The Memoirs of
Chubby Power, ed. N. Ward. (Toronto: Macmillan, 1966), p . 376,
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Similarly, the support given to King by Iw-tariff Liberals
was to be expected, given the protectionist views of Fielding
and Graham.
The support devoted to the party leader

reflected the

unacceptability of opponents who were apparently aligned to
party factions instead of to the Liberal party as a whole.
To some degree, the overxdielming mandate for Mr. St. Laurent
registered a rejection of the candidacy of Mr. Gardiner as
much as an endorsement of the victorious leader.

One delegate

reportedly explained his advocacy of St. Laurent by maintaining
that he would "vote for anyone who could defeat Jimmy
G a r d i n e r . " 2 4

i n

1968, the success of the Trudeau organization’s

strategy in promoting their candidate as a second ballot
choice rather than risking the alienation of delegates by
pushing for a stronger first ballot total illustrated the
disinclination of the party leaders to contribute to a
polarization of opinion and the consequent ability to attract
delegate support as the least undesirable of the remaining
oc
alternatives.
24 Quoted in The Globe and Mail. August 5, 1948.
25 Newman, oo. cit.. p. 460. Analysis of voting behaviour
of delegates has illustrated the strategy was largely successful.
With the exception of Hellyer supporters, who supported Winters,
Mr. Trudeau gathered a large proportion of votes previously
cast for other candidates. See L. Leduc, "Ballot Behaviour in a
National Convention", Paper presented to C.P.S.A. meeting,
Winnipeg, Manitoba, June 2-4, 1970. pp. 19-20,
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Linked to the successful candidates’ ability to
aggregate delegates opposed for various reasons to alternative
candidates, was the professed reluctance of the future leader
to capture the party leadership.

In contrast to the ambitions

of many unsuccessful candidates, the party leader appeared
disinclined to seek the leadership for specific purposes,
Mr. Pearson’s attitude was not uncharacteristic;
When I look back in my career, the most amazing
is that things just happened. Mr. Diefenbaker
said he always had a goal and worked toward it.
Nothing like that with me. I was always alert
for any opportunities or responsibilities or
interesting work, but if I didn't take it on,
it didn’t worry me. I’d do something else. I
have never heim to any particular line. It
was only pressure, really, that got me into
thi s, 26
The typical approach of the eventual leader to his candidacy
seemed to be more of an applicant sought out to fill a certain
position, rather than a politician who was ready to advance a
political cause or interests by attaining the leadership of
the party.

Initially, Mr. Trudeau reported that he felt the

notion of his candidacy to be a good "joke".

The attitude of

Mackenzie King to his o\m candidacy and to that of his
successor in 1948 indicated that certain objective qualities

2^Quoted in Beal, op. cit.. p. 101,
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of a candidate rather than sheer political ambition were
considered the best measure of a potential leader.

27

Successful leadership candidates have avoided the
identification of their pursuit of the party leadership
t-Tith political ambitions favourable to a certain regional or
class grouping.

Due to this characteristic, eventual party

leaders have represented the pursuit of a party consensus
rather than the exacerbation of internal party conflict.

The

position of Quebec relative to the selection of Liberal
leaders has reinforced this consensual role of the successful
candidate.

All Liberal leaders since Laurier have been

selected with the approval of the greater majority of the
delegates from the province of Quebec.

This hypothesis remained

as true of the more competitive occasions

28

as of those

selections which were marked by relatively minor opposition to
the dominant candidate.2^

Despite this clear relationship of

Quebec to the success of a leadership candidate, the party

27see King, op. cit., pp. 361-359 and Dawson, op. cit.,
p. 297.
28see McGregor, op. cit., p. 338; Dawson, op. cit., p. 307;
and P. Stevens and J. SayiTell, "Parliament and Politic?'" in
Canadian Anntml Review for 1963, ed. John Saycyell. (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press,' 1969), p. 26.
2^See S. P. Regenstreif, "The Liberal Party of Canada:
A Political Analysis". (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell
University, 1963), p. 307.
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leader

remained symbolic of a party consensusrather than of

a particular faction.

This

remained the case sincethe

Liberal Party had tended to give a special status to the
ethnic-cultural-regional demands of Quebec and since the
direction of this privileged status was not primarily toivard
the capture of the leadership for a Quebec partisan.
In 1919, although receiving a preponderance of
support from its delegation, Mackenzie King was sympathetic
to, but hardly a virulent partisan of, Quebec.

Despite being

led by a future lieutenant of King, Ernest Lapointe, Quebec
delegates were not particularly intense partisans of any
specific candidate.

Iæ Devoir expressed their mood as

le bloc Québécois manque de direction et se
trouve dans un 'état d’espirit uncertain et
qu’ on peut appeler négatif. 30
Among some delegates, there was an acceptance of the fact
that the Quebec delegation could exercise some influence over
the selection of a leader, but could hardly control the
leadership for itself.
We French-Canadians efface
admit that the leader must
Protestant, and therefore,
Protestants should tell us

ourselves. We
be English
the English
whom they want.^^

3^Quoted in
Devoir. August 5, 1919.
^^Quoted in J. W. Lederle, "The National Organization of
the Liberal and Conservative Parties in Canada", (Unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation. University of Michigan, 1942), p. 70,
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Therefore, Mackenzie King’s candidacy could not be considered
controlled by a particular segment of the party.

Indeed,

King took great pains to dissociate himself from any such
notion since the identification would have tended to alienate
oo

other elements within the Liberal Party.
The Quebec Liberals were not primarily interested in
the control of the party leadership, but did demand the
possession of a veto on candidates who were absolutely
unacceptable.

The veto situation waa characteristic of

Mr. Fielding’s unsuccessful candidacy in 1919.

Due to his

stand on wartime conscription, in which he deserted

the

Liberal party to vote as an independent sympathizer of the
Unionists, the former Finance Minister had incurred the
complete enmity of the federal wing of Quebec Liberals.
Despite the lack of an overwhelming

positive direction in

favour of a certain candidate, the views of the delegation
toward Fielding were clear:
...plus la plupart d’entre eux se sentent
une irresistible repulsion a' voter en
faveur de M. Fielding, 33

32see Dawson, op, cit,. p, 325,
S^Bllodeau, Emest, "M, Fielding et le Bloc Québécois"
Le Devoir. August 5, 1919,
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The application of the "alternation" principle, by
which French-Canadian Quebeckers have occupied the leadership
of the party, has also not been enblema.tic of Quebec control
of the leadership.

The French-Canadian leader emphasized

his attachment to the federal concept rather than to a
parochial loyalty.

The relationship of Mr. Trudeau to the

support of the Quebec delegates in 1968 was only indirect,
since he was apparently considered by more effective leaders
of the Quebec Liberals, such as Jean Marchand, to be an
acceptable candidate to both English as well as French
Canadians.

Personally, Trudeau was considered to have no

independent, Quebec power

b a s e .

^4

Similarly, the previous

French Canadian leader, Mr. St. Laurent, symbolized the
partnership itself of French and English Canada rather than
the interests of one particular member.

Indeed,

the most

virulent attacks directed against the Minister of Ezctemal
Affairs came from the nationalist element in the province
of Quebec.

In a public address, a member of the Union

Nationale party stressed that nationalists could not consider
St. Laurent representative of Quebec;

34See LaMarsh, o£. cit.. p. 353,
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Je me rejouirais le premier, si un Canadien
français était appelé a devenir premier
ministre du Canada.,.mais a condition que
ce soit un veritable Canadien français et non
un impérialiste qui n ’a de français que le nom.35
The tradition of "alternation" did not involve the alternation
of control by regional or ethnic groups over the party leader
ship: it merely represented an affirmation

of the unity upon

which both the Canadian political system and the Liberal
party were based.
The relationship between leadership candidates and
the Quebec wing of the party illustrates the intertwining
of the requirement of party unity and the nature of the party
ideology.

To maintain the adherence of French Canadian elites

to the Liberal party, it was necessary for the group to possess
some form of effective influence on party output, including
leadership. Although control of the leadership would be
detrimental to the unity of the party, the Quebec Liberals
could exert influence in the form of a virtual veto over
unacceptable leaders and by the establishment in the practice
and ideology of the party leadership of the principle of
"alternation".

In many respects, the virtual veto possessed

by Quebec in Liberal leadership selection became a practical,

^^Paul Bouchard, quoted in Le Devoir. July 16, 1948,
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and the principle of alternation an ideological, recognition
of the requirements of party unity, and thereby electoral
success.
This was illustrated no more cogently than in the
rejection of Mr. Fielding in 1919.

The candidacy was totally

unacceptable to Quebec and those other Liberals loyal to the
idea symbolized by Laurier, of the partnership of English
and French Canadians:
,,, I should not wd.sh to stand in the way of any
of our friends who had been loyal to Sir Wilfrid
in the last political contest. I would be quite
unwilling, howrever, to stand aside for anyone
who helped to divide the Liberal party at that
time, 36
The real threat of Mr. Fielding*s candidacy was not solely to
the interests of a particular group - Quebec, but injurious
to the welfare of the party as a whole by encouraging its
dissolution.
I would think it not far xvrong to say it was
’conscription* that defeated Fielding. For
myself at any rate, the one thing that I tvas
bound to do everything I could to accomplish,
xjas to prevent any man who had deserted Laurier
in 1917 becoming our leader in 1919 - because
such a result I believed would have utterly
disrupted and destroyed the party. I know that a
great many \dio were at the Convention had
exactly the same feeling - and I think it was a
very powerful factor in electing King.,,.37

S^King, quoted in Dawson, o£. cit.. p. 297.
37c. Murphy, quoted in H. S. Ferns and B, Ostry; The
Age of Mackenzie King: The Rise of the Leader. (London: William
Heinemann, 1955), p. 317.
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It was therefore in the interests of the party as a whole to
recognize the veto of the Quebec group against a particular
candidate and to select a leader generally acceptable to both
Quebec and the remaining sections of the federal party.
In conclusion, the success of Liberal party leaders
as candidates has derived from their consensual character,
rather than from the capture of a particular faction of the
party.

In the sense that they avoided any polarization of

party opinion on the selection issue, the activity of Liberal
leaders as candidates cannot be considered as primarily
competitive in character.

In conventions, such as 1968 and

to a lesser extent in 1919, when several challengers for
the leadership existed, the association of success

\7ith an

essentially non-competitive, consensual candidate is more
predictable as the

latter could be considered a particularly

advantageous candidate strategy.

However, in 1948 and 1958,

when opponents were few and their strength meagre, the leader’s
position in the center of the party still remained applicable.

Candidates and Leaders:

The Rules of the Game end Preselection

A high degree of competition betvjeen elites for non
elite support has not generally been a dominant characteristic
of leadership selection in the Liberal party.

The most

successful candidates - the party leaders - identified with
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the interests of the party as a whole, rather than a particular
faction, and tended to provoke consensus, rather than conflict.
Only infrequently did candidacies appear which represented
careers or interests emblematic of conflict within the party.
Some candidates who T^re associated, through their political
background, did attempt to introduce competition into the
process of leadership selection.

However, these candidacies

Ti/ere consistently unable to prevent the ascendancy of the
leader who identified izLth party unity and consensus.

Thus,

the lack of success of the professional politician, regional
representative and party reformer indicates that limitation
of conflict in the selection of leaders was associated with
rules of the game tending to discourage the appearance of
internal party conflict, and hence, of elite competition.

The

result of these rules has been to accord a minimal degree of
legitimacy to serious conflict between elites and thereby to
discourage competition for non-elite support.
The nature of preselection as well as the rules of the
game suggest the lack of legitimacy given to internal conflict
as a determinant in the selection of Liberal leaders.

The

characteristics of candidates indicate that the process of
preselection has operated with a bias contrary to candidates
associated ivith party conflict.

Candidates have not emerged
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with great frequency from distinct, parochial interests to
contest the leadership.

With few exceptions, candidates have

been recruited from the centre - the federal Parliamentary
and Cabinet elite - rather than from the margins - provincial
parties and governments or particular party factions - of
Liberal party activity.

As a whole, preselection has been

centripetal rather than centrifugal in direction and
significance.
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CHAPTER VI

THE LIBERAL IDEOLOGY AND THE SELECTION OF LEADERS

The ideological element in party life refers to those
collective values or beliefs which express the orientation of
the political party to its social and political environment,^
To a great extent, party ideology serves to define the
status of internal conflict or solidarity as values within the
party and to stipulate the role of leadership in respect to
these variables.

Thus, the ideological character of a party

constitutes a basic influence on the relative consensual or
competitive nature of leadership selection.
The most prominent ideological trait of the Liberal
Party in the twentieth century has been its conscious effort

^ As an organization promoting group activity, the
political party must exhibit an ideological framework, at least
in order to justify its oim existence. In most parties the
ideological framework will also include a legitimation of
the political regime and other social systems. See Max Weber,
From Max Weber; Essays in Sociology, ed. Hans Gerth and C. W.
Mills (New York; Oxford University Press, 1948), p. 194. An
ideology is neither synonymous X'/ith the belief-systems of
individual members or to the actual situation of the party in
relation to external reality. The political belief-system,
which consists "of the set of beliefs according to which
individuals navigate and orient themnelves in the sea of
politics," - Sartori, Giovanni, "Politics, Ideology and Belief
Systems," American Political Science Review. LRIII (June, 1969),
400 - relates to ideology only in respect to the correspondence
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to "unify" rather than "divide" the Canadian social system.
In consequence of this and of the high importance accorded
to leadership in achieving it, party definition of the
leadership role has stressed its ability to personify this
characteristic.

Thus the leaders of the Liberal party have

consistently stressed their identification with Liberal
formulas of national unity - the recognition of the partner
ship of English-speaking and French-speaking Canadians, the
conception of the Liberals as a non-class, "center" party,
and finally the idea that the Liberal Party provided for
the government of "all" of Canada rather than government in
the interests of particular regions.
The leadership of the Liberal Party has perhaps been
most exemplary in its representation of the unity betxyeen
French and English Canadians.

The words of a former leader,

Mr. St, Laurent clearly express the pattern by which the
Canadian state is viewed;

^of some beliefs xd.th a justification for adherence
to the collective activity of a group or institution. Ideology
may not correspond to the actual character of reality. The
fact that it represents to varying degrees a distortion of
reality does not however detract from the function it nonethe
less performs. For a discussion of ideology’s role in social
izing individuals’ beliefs with collective activity and
ideology’ s "false consciousness", see Karl Mannheim. Ideology
and Utopia. (New York; Harcourt, Brace and World, 193F)
p. 21,
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...our nation was planned as a political partner
ship o£ two great races; it was planned by men of
vision, of tolerance, as a partnership in which
both of the partners would retain their essential
characteristics, their religion, their language,
their culture. To realize that plan, to make it
X7ork, has elx^ays required and still requires a
practical recognition in the government of the
partnership of those two historic races, 2
The ideal of "partnership" has been carried into the practice
of Liberal leadership by the principle of "alternation".
The concept of "alternation" is more than a mere observation
of the fact that English-Canadian and French-Canadian names
have alternately occupied the position of party leader.
Although the suitability of the principle xvas not necessarily
favoured, a survey of the 1968 leadership convention revealed
a vast majority of delegates recognized the existence of such
a "Tradition" and indeed ballots for individual candidates
O

were explained, (or rationalized) on this basis.
The principle of alternation cannot be claimed to be
an exclusive determinant of party leadership.

However, it

would seem at least a marginal consideration even at the
level of convention balloting.

Moreover, the belief in the

n

St. Laurent, L. S., quoted in D. C. Thomson, Louis
St. Laurent; Canadian. (Toronto; Macmillan, 1967), p. 528.
3See S. P. Regenstreif, "Note on the ’Alternation’ of
French and English Leaders of the Liberal Party of Canada",
Canadian J o u m a l of Political Science, III (March, 1969),
118-122.
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"partnership" idea imbedded in the Liberal party has had the
effect of facilitating the recruitment of French-Canadian
elites with leadership potential,4 as well as socializing
party cadres to the acceptability of French-speaking
Canadians as leaders.

Both of these circumstances would be

difficult, for instance, given the prominent ideology of the
5
Conservative party.
The search for what x^as felt to be the
"necessary" Quebec candidate prior to the 1968 leadership
convention, regardless of his leadership chances, illustrates

^Ernest Lapointe and Louis St. Laurent are txm of the
more prominent examples. The latest and most comprehensive
recruitment included the trio of Marchand, Trudeau and
Pelletier. See P. C. Nexvman, The Distemper of Our Times.
(Toronto: McClelland and Stexmrt, 1968), pp. 370-372. In relation
to the integration of French-Canadian elites, it may be useful
to consider the function of the Liberal party in promoting or
maintaining a stable democratic system by "consociational"
means - "Democracies with subcultural cleavages and xd.th tendencies
toxvard immobilism and instability which are deliberately turned
into more stable systems by the leaders of the major subcultures.."
See Arend Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems", in
Politics in Europe; Comparisons and Interpretations, A. Lijphart
éd. (Englewood Cliffs; Prentice-Hall, 1969), p. 63. For an
application of this scheme to the Canadian political system,
see S. J. R. Noel, "Political Parties and Elite Accommodation:
Interpretations of Canadian Federalism", A paper presented to the
annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association,
University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, June 1970, pp. 21-34.
^The Conservative party has not had a French-speaking
leader nor has such an individual been considered for the post,
either in convention or wdthin inner party circles. See D. Peacock,
J o u m e y to Power. (Toronto; Macmillan, 1968), pp. 13-109; P. C.
Nexvman, Renegade in Power. (Toronto; McClelland and Stexyart, 1963),
pp. 24-31, 44-47; and Ruth M. Bell, "Conservative Party National
Conventions, 1927-1956". Unpublished Master’s thesis, (Carleton
University, 1965).
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clearly the legitimate role which the Quebec membership
perceived it possessed within the leadership race,^
In addition to its influence on the alternation
principle, the value of English and French Canadian partner
ship has been reflected in the character of the FrenchCanadian leaders of the party.

Including Sir Wilfrid Laurier,

each have personified the conception of the Canadian state as
a partnership betx^een the two major ethnic groups.

As well

as being fluently bilingual, the leaders* family and
educational backgrounds epitomized the reconciliation of
dualism with unity.^

By exposure to both sides of the

&See Nexvman, The Distemper of Our Times, op. cit.. pp.
402-403 and Peacock, o^. cit.. p. 222. During consultations
concerning the candidate to be representative of French Canada,
Prime Minister Pearson was reported to have said; "This is a
tradition of the Liberal Party - and he may or may not win.
But he must be a good candidate and get a lot of votes, and
\<re must shoxf that although the Tories can’t we can
alxyays
come up with an alternative from Quebec." Quoted in P. Stevens
and J. Saywell, "Parliament and Politics", in The Canadian
Annual Review for 1968 ed, J. Sayxmll. (Toronto; University
of Toronto Press, 1969;, p. 17.
?Both Trudeau and St. Laurent came from families of
mixed ethnic backgroxmd. These txvo leaders and Sir Wilfrid
Laurier had early exposure to English language or culture due
to family or educational experience. The former pair used
English as a home language. See Thomson, op. cit.. Douglas
Stuebing,
al., Trudeau; A Man for Tomorroxy." (Toronto;
Clarke, Irxd.n, 1968), pp. 5-6 and Joseph Schull, Laurier;
The First Canadien. (Toronto; Macmillan, 1965), pp. 19-24.
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Canadian partnership, these leaders represented a biethnic as
xvell as a bilingual fusion.
The fusion of the two ethnic identities into a single
individual was directly related to the form of leadership
characteristic of

the Liberal Party.

In explaining the

inapplicability of the principle of "dual leadership" in the
St. Laurent Cabinet of 1948, one historian has remarked:
The characteristics of the two groups were
interxTOven in the Prime Minister’s otm
personality, and he was no more able to
conceive of a cabinet composed of two teams
representing two separate groups than he was of
splitting his own personality. 8
Thus, in a very real sense, the political leadership of St.
Laurent represented a transcendence of the dualism upon
which the Canadian partnership was founded.
The fusion of the two ethnic groups, which these
Liberal leaders exemplified, and the subsequent form of
leadership in which it resulted, meant that the FrenchEnglish partnership and the

principle of alternation of

leaders represented a unifying rather than a disintegrating

^Thomson, D. C., "The Cabinet of 1948", in Cabinet
Formation and Bicultural Relations, ed. F. W. Gibson,
Volume VI oï~Studies of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism
and Biculturalism. (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1970), p. 154.
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ideology.

The Liberal leaders from French Canada interpreted

their leadership and the nature of French-English partnership
within a predominating belief in the supremacy of the partner
ship over either of its constituent parts.

Demands for the

illegitimate patronage of one "partner” - French Canada xvere thus not consistent with the partnership ideal.

In his

approach to the issue. Prime Minister St. Laurent
... saxy the relationship between French and
English Canadians not as a group, but on an
individual basis, as citizens of the same
state, with equal rights...Concomitant with
this principle of ’practical equality' xms
his insistence that French Canadians should
demonstrate their competence to occupy
postions of responsibility and not demand a
percentage of them merely as a right. 9
The resistance to parochial challenges to the unity represented
by the partnership idea v/as further pointed out by Mr. Trudeau’s
position on the nationalist propensities of French Canada.
...the nationalists...are politically reactionary
because, in attaching such importance to the idea
of nation, they are surely led to a definition
of the common good as a function of an ethnic
group, rather than of all the people, regardless
of characteristics. 10
Thus, as the French-Canadian leader of the Liberal party

represented the partnership as a whole rather than merely one

^Thomson, "The Cabinet of 1948", oo. cit.. p.144.
^^Trudeau, P. E., Federalism and the French Canadians.
(Toronto: Macmillan, 1968), p. 169.
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of its members, the ideology of French-English partnership
accorded a special place to French Canada only in terms of
the perceived coincidence of its interests xvith those of
Canadian unity.

In this manner, the partnership idea

contributed to the party ideology’s general emphasis on the
value of political solidarity end unity.
A second quality of the Liberal Party is its nonclass o r i e n t a t i o n , w h i c h some observers have claimed to
be the definitive characteristic of the party relative to
the Canadian party system.

12
' A former Cabinet Minister

explained the party position in this manner:

Ifn terms of electoral support the non-class ethos of
the Liberal party seems to be mirrored in reality. See R. R.
Alford, Party and Society. (Chicago: Pvsnd-McNally, 1963), p. 253;
also Alford, "The Social Basis of Political Cleavage in 1962",
Papers on the 1962 Election, ed. John Meisel. (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1964), p. 209. On the other hand,
the argument has been advanced that non-class ideologies may
originate from a specific social class, such as the petite
bourgeoisie. See R. Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in
Industrial Society. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959),
p. 99. Certainly the Liberals have been attacked as a "class"
party by critics such as Stanley Knowles, The Nexv Party.
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1961), pp. 2-5. Hoxvever,
whether or not in terms of policy output the party has been
"non-class" is immaterial to the non-class nature of its
ideology.
12See Alford or?, cit.. p. 253; Gad Horowitz, Canadian
Labour in Politics. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1969), p. 29; and S. P. Regenstreif, The Diefenbaker Interlude.
(Toronto: Longmans, 1964), p.
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The Liberal view is that true political progress
is narked by...the reconciliation of classes, and
the promotion of the general interest above all
particular interests. 13
This belief in the substitution of community interest for the
interests of a particular group or class has also been
reflected in the attitudes and characteristics of Liberal
leaders.

Thus, in many xmys the contribution of Mackenzie

King as an intellectual to the field of industrial relations
mirrored the stance of the Liberal Party with respect to
labour policy.
A solution to the problems of industry is not to
be looked for in forms. .A nexy spirit alone wd.ll
suffice. This spirit must...breathe mutual
confidence and constructive good-will. It must be
founded on a belief in an underlying order which
presupposes betxjeen individuals, not conflict,
but community of interest in all that pertains
to human well-being. 14
As a politician, Mr. King believed in the Liberal Party as the
instrument of this reconciliation:
As the bulxmrk of freedom. Liberalism stands mid
way betX'jeen those forces that seek the protection
of special privilege or vested interests...and
those forces that seek the control of the nation’s
in the interest of one or more classes or economic
groups. 15

^^Pickersgill, J. W.. The Liberal Party. (Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart, 1962;, p. 68.
^4King, W. L. M . , Industry and Hximanity. (Toronto: ,T. Allen,
1918), p. 148.
^^King, W. L. M . , "Address by the Right Honourable W. L.
Mackenzie King on his Years of Leadership - and Reasons for
Retirement as Party Leader", (Ottawa: National Liberal
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Finally, the party ideology has tended to emphasize
the Liberals’ character as a truly "national", i.e. federal,
party.

In the prevailing party view, only a "national"

party, such as the Liberal, is capable of coalescing the
various parochial strains emanating from the diverse
regions of Canada.

Consequently the party

.. .must esqpress only the highest common factors
behind which majority support can be mobilized
...We occupy half a continent; there is enormous
diversity of regional economic interest..
Government in this country can be carried on only
by alliances, by forming coalitions of regional
and other interests. 16
Thus, the Liberal party becomes the political vehicle
transcending the diversity of the Canadian social structure.
In contrast to the

party as a whole, represented by

its membership, and to governmental institutions such as the
Senate and Cabinet, in which a simple principle of
representation can be

applied, the party leader was obliged

to stand alone as a symbol of the all-inclusive nature of
the p a r t y . T h i s
the

fact itself was sufficient to influence

successful political leader to eschew identification

1^Jewett, Pauline, Canadian Liberalism; Its Philosophy.
Party pamphlet ivith no date. pp. 1-2.
Duverggr speaks of "scientific democracy" in this
context - proportional representation according to regional or
other affiliation. See M. Duverger, Political Parties.(London;
Methuen, 1954), p. 158. This has not been applicable given the
historical definition of Prime Ministerial leaders. Only one
individual has possessed both the formal and informal authority
of the leader, despite prevalent myths concerning "dual leadershin". See F. W. Gibson. "Conclusions", in Gibson on. cit.. n . 155.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

143
xd-th particular regional interests.

However, reinforcing

this situation has been the tendency of parties governing
over a long period of time at the federal level, to associate
themselves with the "centralist" points of view expressed by
the federal career bureaucracy.

Certainly the Liberal Party,

in terms of its policies^^ and

of its recruitment practices,

has not been independent of these influences.
The consequence of such factors was to emphasize the
"national” nature of a leader’s role as a criterion for
leadership selection.

In fact, the leaders of the Liberal

Party since Laurier have satisfied this criterion to the
extent that both their careers and belief-systems have
coincided with the party’s definition of national rather than
regional patterns.

In contrast to leaders of the Conservative

Party and unsuccessful Liberal candidates, such as J. G,
Gardiner and Eric Kierans, the leaders of the Canadian Liberals
in the 20th century have had no appreciable career in
provincial politics.

See John Meisel, The Canadian General Election of 1957.
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), p. 38 for an
identification of the influence of the federal bureaucracy on
the 1957 Liberal election platform.
l^See J. Porter, The Vertical Mosaic. (Toronto; University
of Toronto Press, 1965), pp. 405-415. Such national career
patterns are also characteristic of British party elites. See
Richard Rose, Politics in England; An Interpretation. (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1967), p. 90.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

144

The predominance of career patterns at the federal
level of government has paralleled the existence of beliefsystems emphasising a "federal" view of the Canadian state.
In this view, the viability of the Canadian federal system,
represented by the existence of a federal, "Canadian",
national government, is to be protected against the centri
fugal forces operating within the constitutent regions.
most ardent defender of this outlook, in

The

intellectual terms,

is the present leader, Mr. Trudeau;
It is now becoming obvious that federalism has all
along been a product of reason in politics. It xyas
b o m of a decision by pragmatic politicians to face
facts as they are, particularly the fact of the
heterogeneity of the world’s population. It is an
attempt to find a rational compromise based on the
will of the people. 20
As federal Minister of Justice during a period of
constitutional "crisis", Mr. Trudeau’s viewpoints on the
issue of "Canadianism" vjere perhaps his most significant
contribution to the political scene prior to the 1968
convention.

Thus, in the government publication Federalism

for the Future prepared under his supervision, the view was
exp re ssed that ;

^^Trudeau, op. cit.. p. 195.
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A constitution is more than a legal document; it
is an expression of how the people within a state
may achieve their social, economic, and cultural
aspirations...Canada’s identity is its diversity
and its unity; we lose ourselves if we lose our
ttyo linguistic communities, our diverse cultural
heritages, or our several regional identities.
We lose them all if we lose the Canada in which
they have been able to exist and develop. 21
As a result of his long legal practice and tenure
as Minister of Justice, the former leader, Mr. St. Laurent
occupied a similar ideological position.

As a counsel for

the federal government, a member of the Rowell Sirois
Commission, a president of the Canadian Bar Association and
prominent figure in the preparation of the post-war "Creen
Boole" proposals, Mr. St. Laurent’s background was consistently
associated with institutions or beliefs emphasizing "federal"
rather than "regional" interests within the Canadian political
system.
The association of Liberal leaders ifith federal careers
and belief systems did not, of course, extend to a negation
of the federal systeia itself by resorting to unitary govern
ment .

The King-Lapointe defence of provincial autonomy in the

2lThe Government of Canada. Federalism for the Future.
(Otta;va: Queen’s Printer, 1958), p. 10.
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29

1920’s

and a similar stance by Mr. Trudeau at the 1966

National Liberal Conference,

23

in contrast to the centralizing

tendencies of the post-war party, are illustrative of this
point.

Rather it was the defence of federalism, and there

fore of Canadian national unity, combined with the pragmatic
adoption of certain interpretations of it, depending on the
political situation, which constituted the essence of the
Liberal ideology.

Thus, in his approach to a particular

problem of the constitutionality of federal policy Mackenzie
King "had no e:tplicit theory of the economic responsibilities
of a federal government...For him it was a political problem".
In the conduct of party affairs, as well as governmental policy,
a similar approach was evident.

The federal nature of the

party necessitated a balance between the interests of presenting
a unifying national party end the legitimate demands of
provincial party autonomy.

25

22 See Kenneth McNaught, A Prophet in Politics. (Toronto;
University of Toronto Press, 1959), p. 10.
23 See The Clobe and Mail, October 13, 1966.
24 Neatzby, H. B., William Lyon Mackenzie King: 1924-1932.
The Lonely Heights. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963),
p. 222. This thesis is also borne out by other analyses of the
king era. See J. R. Mallory, Social Credit and the Federal Power
in Canada. (Toronto; University of Toronto Press, 19547, p. 189
and McNaught, op. cit., pp. 176-181.
oc

Thus, despite great divergence in philosophy, person
ality, and policy, federal and provincial parties coexist under
identical labels. See N. McKenty Mitchell Hepburn. (Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart, 1968) and M.' A. Urmsby, "Ï. Dufferin
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In intraparty as well as interparty politics a
dominant ideological theme was the recognition of the role
of the federal formula in preserving Canadian unity.

The

essential qualifiaction of the successful leader was there
fore an identification, as measured by eîiplicit beliefs or
by consonant career patterns, vTitli this formula and id.th
the corresponding conception of the party leader.

Ideology and Party Leadership
Party ideology provides an important theoretical link
between the nature of party and the form of political leader
ship which it possesses.

Research into the leadership of

groups has asserted that leadership is conducted within a
framework imposed by the group’s conception of its collective
purpose and of the normal procedures for achievement of this
p u r p o s e . I n some respects, therefore, leadership is
selected and persists in response to its adherence to the

2^Patullo and the Little New Deal” , in The Politics of
Discontent, ed. R. Cook. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1957). For a study of this situation in another Canadian party,
see E. R. Black, "Federal Strains Within a Canadian Party",
in Party Politics in Canada. ed. I-I. G. Thorbum. (Scarborough:
Prentice-IIall, 196TJ.
26see E. P. Hollander, Leadership, Groups, and Influence.
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 11,
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collective values of the group or organization involved:
The dominant belief determines the legitimacy
of a leader, in the sociological sense of the
tern "legitimate". 27
The significance of party ideology rests in its
preeminent role as a determinant of political attitudes
v/ithin the party.

Although it represents a cognitive

response to external conditions, ideology also vitally
affects the internal activity of the political party.
Depending on the nature

of the party, ideological reaction

to the environment will involve the articulation of goals
which are directed to both external and internal needs.2#
Regardless of their internal or external basis, internal
party processes lyill nonetheless be influenced by the
character of these goals.

The goals defined by the party

ideology constitute the normative foundation upon which party

27Duverger, op. cit.. p. 133.
28External goals or needs are defined in relation to the
party’s performance in the political system as a whole, e.g. the
pursuit of electoral success. In contrast, goals and needs
defined in terms of the party’s membership can be considered
"internal". An example of internal needs and goals are those
deriving from the necessity of creating a "social movement". For
a discussion of the dialectic between the latter internal goal
and the external goal of electoral success in a Canadian party,
see Walter D. Young, The Anatomy of a Party: The National ÇCF,
1932-1961. (Toronto:*llniversity ÔÎ Toronto Press,' 1969),
passim.
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activity is based.

Consequently, the nature of the party

ideology dictates the form of political subculture

xd-thin

which all internal party processes occur.

Diagram 2: Party Ideology And Leadership Selection

POLITICAL SYSTEM (EtîVIPvONIîEI-ÎT)
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POLITIC
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- rules of the game
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EXTERNAL
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/
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I

k
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\

\

INTERNAL PARTY (DALS
In this manner, party ideology is a vital factor
shaping the context in which party leadership operates and in
which it is selected.

The interaction of leaders and of

potential leaders or candidates is conducted xvithin and, to
OQ

............

'

'

As party has been considered a system of political
behaviour, it is permissible to speak of a political culture, (or
subculture, since the party is clearly operating vdthin a wider
political and cultural system), applicable to this activity.
Political culture is the set of attitudes, beliefs and senti
ments which give order and meaning to a political process and
which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern
behavior in the ... system". Pye, L. W., "Political Culture in
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Volume XII,
ed. D. L. Sills. (New York: Free Press, 1 % 8 ) , p. 218.
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some extent, resolved by the ideological character of the
institution or group involved.

The prevailing rules of

candidate and elite behaviour thus reflect these ideological
traits.

Moreover, party ideology xyill substantially

influence the f o m of preselection characteristic of the
leadership selection process.

Txi70 manifestations of the

influence of ideological considerations on the process of
selecting leadership are thus apparent: the characteristics
of individuals who through "preselection" are eliminated at
various levels of

the selection process,

30

and the rules

of the game tdiich govern interaction among these elites
and betxTeen elites and other members of the organization.
The ideology of the Liberal party xvas not merely a
philosophical guide to action, but also to a great eictent
corresponded to the actual position of the party in the
Canadian political system.

In terms of electoral support,

the Liberal party appealed to a broad range of class,
regional and ethnic groups, as well as representing through
its elite cocposition the co-operation of the two major

^^The emergence of candidates represents only the
highest stage of the selection process at which "preselection"
occurs. See Kenneth Prewitt, "From the Many are Chosen the Fex^\
American Behavioural Scientist. XIII (November-December, 1969),
169-188.
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ethnie identities.

It is this electoral characteristic

which xvas seen to account for the preeminent success of the
Liberal party at the national level.

As electoral success

constituted the preeminent concern of the party, a natural
consequence ims adherence to an ideology which xms perceived
to ezgress the formula for the achievement of this goal.
The primacy of electoral success also tended to
promote the inportance of this external goal at the expense
of alternative, internal goals.

Since the external goal

of electoral success was predominant, the formulas
corresponding to this objective constituted the major
ideological framework xyithin which party activity was
conducted.

Thus, the emphasis on consensus characteristic of

Liberal ideology became the dominant feature of the political
subculture xvhich governed the internal processes of the
party, including the selection of leader.
The form of preselection characteristic of Liberal
leadership selection was consistent xfith the dominance of
the party’s consensual ideology.

In the process of reduction

or preselection in respect to the emergence of leadership
candidates, consensual rather than conpetitive qualifications
tended to prevail.

Few candidates were associated, through

previous political behaviour, xvith parochial groups or
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institutions \7hich could form a basis for a competitive
leadership struggle.

Those candidates who xmre so disposed

did not succeed in becoming party leaders.

Thus, the

characteristics of Liberal leaders reveals further the nature
of preselection applicable to the party.

Hie political back

ground of the party leader tended to stress identification
xd.th the membership and ideology of the party, (and of the
political system), as a xjhole.

In general, preselection in

respect to candidates and leaders in the Liberal party
directed the process toward the center and consensus rather
than to the periphery and conflict.
Tlie influence of the party ideology was further
reflected in the rules of

the game describing the behaviour

of candidates and elites xd-thin the selection process.

The

introduction of competition or conflict as significant

rules

for candidate behaviour x-zas infrequent.

Generally, the

resolution of leadership selection x-ms accomplished by the
application of non-competitive or consensual rules of the
game.

Candidates, X'jho failed to abide by these consensual

rules x^ere notably unsuccessful in their pursuit of the
leadership.

In contrast, the eventual party

leaders were

most successful as candidates by pursuing consensus instead
of conflict.

Consequently, success x^as equated xvdLth resemblance
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to the highest common denominator - the party; failure often
consisted in alignment xzith only a particular segment of the
organization.
Leadership selection in the Liberal party xvas
accomplished x-dthin the limits established by the character
of preselection and of the prevailing rules of the game.

The

exact nature of the latter parameters corresponded to the
dominant features of the party ideology.

Tlius, Liberal

leaders have not been chosen independent of the influence in this case, ideological - of the political party.

Hox^ever,

this is not to deny, leaders xvhen established, do not them
selves profoundly shape the party ideology.

In fact, the

interaction of leadership and ideology is reciprocal, xfith
the

rules of candidate behaviour end preselection representing

the intermediate stage of ideology’s influence on the
form of leadership.
The significance of this relationship in the Liberal
party has consisted in its remarkable congruence over the
period from 1919 to 1968.

Related to this congruence of

party ideology and leadership, is the long, unchallenged
tenure of Liberal leaders during this period.

Hoxyever, it is
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Diagram 3:

Party Leadership And Party Ideology
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PRESELECTION

SELECTION

PARTY
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also connected xjlth the inordinately effective performance of
the Liberal party in terms of its primary goal of electoral
success.

The tenure of leadership has been considered to be

related to the degree of electoral success of the party.

This

relationship alone is unable to account for instability of
leadership in some parties, even xdien electoral success is
present - for ejcaraple the Diefenbaker experience of the
Conservative governments of the early 1960* s.

The experience

of the Liberal party suggests that electoral success and
security of leadership tenure are most complimentary xdien
the party has both accepted the unqualified preeminence of the
former

goal, and possesses an elaborate ideology which promotes

its dominant position.
31see P. C. Neivman, Renegade in Power, on. cit., pp. 353382.
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CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

The preceding argtiment has investigated variables
indicating the intensity and scope of conflict over the issue
of leadership selection in the Liberal Party of Canada - the
structure of the mechanism of selection, the character of
preselection, and the nature of the rules of the game
governing participant behaviour.
that the leadership convention

The analysis has revealed
did not ultimately constitute

a selection mechanism allo^ying the control of elites by non
elites or for the competition betvzeen elites for the support
of non-elites.

Moreover, the character of preselection and

rules of the game tended to limit the appearance of strong
competition between elites and to resolve existing conflict
to the detriment of the most competitive candidates.

As a

rule then. Liberal leadership selection has not tended to
conform to the democratic model, but resembled to a great
degree a non-conflict or consensual process.
Influences cn the Nature of Leadership Selection
The analysis of leadership selection in the Liberal
party has sustained two propositions concerning the nature of
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the selection process: (1) the lack of a rigorous competitive
or democratic framework and (2) the predominance of con
sensual variables as the operating criteria of selection.

To

account for the prevalence of these characteristics, three
factors can be mentioned - Liberal party ideology, the
structural characteristics of the party and the structure and
function of the mechanism of selection itself.
The structural characteristics of a political party
provide the most immediate influence on the nature of its
internal processes.

The most significant structural

characteristics of the Liberal party of Canada over the
period 1919 to 1968 have been those deriving from its cadre
nature

1

and its close relationship to governmental power.

In consequence of these characteristics of

2

the party, the

probability, (and suitability), of a leadership selection
process which provided either for the control of elites by

^Tlie structure of a cadre party resembles a "grouping
of notabilities for the preparation of elections, conducting
campaigns and maintaining contact td.th the candidates." See M.
Duverger, Political Parties (London: Methuen, 1959), p. 64.
For the Liberal party as a cadre party, see Engelmann, F. C.
and Schïvartz, M . , Political Parties and the Canadian Social
Structure (Toronto: Prentice-Hall, lW7), p. '2'4'8'.
^According to the typology developed by Engelmann and
Schimrtz the Liberal party is a broad-based, success-oriented,
cadre party which has possessed governmental power, op. cit..
p. 248.
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ïicn-elites or for the extensive competition of elites for
non-elite support was diminished.
The subservient role of non-elites in relation to the
occupancy of the leadership position stems from the nature of
party as an organized political group.

According to the

traditional theory of party oligarchy, as ezcpounded by
Robert Michels and others, the masses or non-elites are in
capable of self-government.^

Consequently,

Organization implies the tendency to oligarchy.
In every organization, whether it be a political
party, a professional union, or any other
association of the kind, the aristocratic
tendency manifests itself very clearly.
The mechanism of the organization while con
ferring a solidity of structure, induces serious
changes in the organized mass, completely
inverting the respective positions of leaders and
led. As a result of organization every party or
professional union becomes divided into a minority
of directors and majority of directed. 4
In respect to the most pre-eminent party office - party
leaders, non-elites cannot practically control the position
through the direct assumption of its functions.

Rather, the

prerogative of control was applicable only in the sense that
non-elites could threaten to replace existing leadership with

^See Michels Robert, Political Parties; A Sociological
Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of M o d e m Democracy (IÏew
York; Hearst* s,' l9l5)' p.'‘390 and also Duverger, on. cit.. p. 151.
^Ibid.. p. 38.

.
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another elite or choose among elites competing for the
position.
If elite competition is discouraged, non-elite
influence is further reduced.

According to his conception of

party as oligarchy, Michels’ believed that the circulation of
elites in positions of authority was more assimilative than
competitive in character.^

A contrary formulation has

maintained that the occupancy of elite position reflects
a " stratarchic" rather than oligarchic party structure.

Tlius,

party possesses a more diverse elite group, which necessitates
conflict and accommodation.^
The oligarchic rather than stratarchic model has been
more appropriate to the conduct of leadership selection in
the Liberal party of Canada.

Thus, the low significance of

democratic or conflict criteria in the selecting of Liberal
leaders derives from a party structure discouraging the
development of independent centres or foundations of
political poxTer from which sets of counter-elites could be
recruited.

Of special significance xfas the lack of secondary

associations reasonably detached from the control of the

% i c b e l s , op. cit.. p. 378.
&See Eldersveld, S. J., Political Parties: A Behavioural
Analysis. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), pp. 9-10.'"
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prevailing party elite.

According to at least one study of

the conditions of democratic systems, this constitutes a
basic necessity for the institution of internal conflict.^
Thus, the lack of viable independent secondary organizations,
represented by the inferior status and influence possessed by
both the federal extra-Parliamentary party and the provincial
Liberal parties encouraged, along xd.th the party discipline
enforced by the Cabinet-Parliamentary system of government,
the undemocratic nature of the party structure.
The development of the Liberal Party of Canada has
featured the predominance of the Parliamentary party and
leader at the expense of an independent extra-Parliamentary
organization.

In fact, the 1948 leadership convention xms

the first held in which any official party organization out
side of the legislative party existed.
influence

Its inability to

the direction of party output as a counterbalance

to the Cabinet and party leader was witnessed by the latter*s
usually preeminent control over the nature of party policy.
As previously discussed, the resolutions of party conventions
xmre not considered as binding directives of legislative
7See Lipset, S. M. et.
Union Democracy: The Internal
Politics’of the International Typographical Union. (Nex7 York:
Doubleday, Anchor, 1956), pp. 92-117. Also F. E. Jones, "Structural
Determinants of Consensus and Cohesion in Complex Organizations".
Canadian Reviexf of Sociology and Anthropology. V (November, 1968),
227.
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leadership.

The creation of electoral programs was usually

the prerogative of Parliamentary elites in xdiich the inter
vention of the party organisation xms rare.^
The ineffectiveness of extra-Parliamentary organisation
xms evident in leadership selection as xzell as policy formation.
Although the great majority of delegates to conventions xmre
not holders or past holders of legislative office, the absence
of a strong, centralized party organization made inevitable
the identification of these delegates with elites in the
legislative party and xd.th the goals^ articulated by this
elite.

There xms little opportunity therefore for an

alternative group of elites or set of goals to conpete xfith
those prevailing under the existing leadership.

This dominance

of the Liberal legislative party was moreover, manifested in
the prerogative of the party leader for much of this period
in respect to the initiation or call of a national leadership
convention.

In addition, the

preeminent role of the

legislative party was reflected in the significant degree of

^For one excellent example of this procedure, see John
Meisel, The Canadian General Election of 1957. (Toronto*
University of Toronto Press, 1962), p. 38.
^In practical terms, the predominance of external goals
of electoral success as stipulated by the party ideology. The
fusion of legislative and bureaucratic parties meant the goals
and ideology of the former remained fundamentally unchallenged.
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delegate strength it maintained at each convention.
The lack of effective extra-Parliaraentary challenges
to the leadership of the Liberal party was especially vital
in view of the unity and discipline required of legislative
elites under a Cabinet form of government.

Esxept for 1919,

all leadership conventions of the Liberal party have been
held during periods of Liberal government (1948, 1968) or at
a time xdien prospects of future electoral success were
regarded as high.

The demands, xdiich xjere often articulated

by the party leader^ for solidarity and discipline among
Cabinet elites restricted the amount of open policy debate
x-Tith which the Parliamentary elites could talce issue.

In

1948 and 1968 particularly, prolonged engagement in policy
debate xvas not appreciated by the party leader and Prime
Minister.

Moreover, advocacy of policies xdiich contradicted

previous party, and therefore Cabinet, policy were somexdiat
incongruous since the critic himself had participated in
and was responsible for these decisions.

It x^as not incidental,

therefore, that two of the three specific critics of past
party policy and advocates of specific policy alternatives
- C. G. Power and Eric Kierans - xfere outside the jurisdiction
of Cabinet rules.

Certainly, in the 1968 case, sanctions

xvere threatened against those candidates xvho otherxvlse would
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have felt obliged to pursue a more programmatic leadership
campaign.
The

costs of incurring sanctions imposed by the

present or future party leader xmre highest xvith respect
to those candidates who, due to their political background,
would be most likely to challenge the party leadership.
potential candidates

The

x-jith the most political ambition, xfhose

political career was extensive, x-;ould incur the heaviest
penalties, in terms of status, by the loss of Cabinet
position.10

The "political outsider", xdio had less attachment

and need for the status incurring from political office,
ironically did not possess the political ambition to conpete
for the party leadership.

The restrictions of Cabinet govern

ment on competitiveness betxveen elites xms most effective,
since

it affected inordinately precisely those elites X'jho

otherxd.se x»70uld be most likely to challenge existing leadership.
Prolonged tenure as the government party also
encouraged the inability of provincial parties to act as
foundations for the emergence of counter elites in opposition
to the existing party leadership or in competition xdth federal

lOThe effects on the status of elites of internal conflict
over the leadership roles has been suggested as a prime variable
in the emergence of two-party, democratic systems xdthin organ
izations.See Lipset, et. ai., o£. cit., pp. 239-247.
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party elites.

Certainly a comparison of elites vying for the

leadership of the Canadian Liberal and Conservative parties
represents a correlation betx^een possession of federal
executive pox^er and the significance of leaders of
provincial parties.

11

There is reason to maintain tliat long tenure in
federal government by the Liberal party has had the effect,
through party s t r u c t u r e , o f denigrating the role of
provincial parties as major influences on federal leadership
selection.

Under the structure of success-seeking parties,

the nexus of party structure is provided by the material and
psychological benefits deriving from the extent of the party*s
capture of executive

poiver.

In e federal party system, the

level of party most capable of providing these benefits xd.ll
g a m e r the more thorough attachment of party adherents and
therefore constitute a stronger foundation upon v/hich political

TlPor the lack of provincial party elites among
Liberal candidates in contrast to those of the Conservatives,
see Chapter IV. Since 1919, the Liberal party has held federal
office for all but 12 of 52 (to 1971) years.
12of course, ideology is a major variable here too.
/. "federal" party ideology has not been unremoved from this
monopoly of government and its effect on party structure.
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elites and leaders can function.

1q

Tlie inordinate success

of the federal Liberals has resulted in the ability to
distribute a multitude of rex'jards to supporters and in the
consequent preeminence of federal Parliamentary elites.

In

the actual selection of leaders, the relatively more
favourable position of federal elites xvas reinforced by the
election of delegates on the basis of federal constituency
organizations.

Since a great proportion of these delegates

VTere actually holders

of some form of constituency office

and xfere elected by the local federal constituency party,
it can be assumed that these delegates x\7ere those most likely
to have received rewards from the federal party* s position in
the past and therefore most favourable to the leadership and
goals represented by the federal Parliamentary elite.
Given this centralized structure, xAich is maintained by
continued electoral success, provincial parties have not

l^The argument has been advanced that Canadian oarties
generally tend to be relatively more centralized than the
federal party system of the United States, for example. See
Corry, J. A. and Hcdgetts, J. E., Democratic Government and
Politics, 3rd edition (Toronto; University of Toronto Press,
1959), p. 251. Comparisons of the txvo major Canadian parties
have concluded the Liberals to be more centralized than the
Conservatives. See Meisel, John, "Recent Changes in Canadian
Parties", in Party Politics in Canada. 2nd edition, ed.
Thorbum, II. G., (Toronto; Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 45.
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provided foundations upon which Internal conflict over
leadership selection could be based.

The continuing tendency

toward greater separation of federal and provincial parties,
exemplified by the formation of a distinct, federal Quebec
Liberal party in 1964, has no doubt, assuming continued
electoral success, accelerated this tendency.

In this respect,

party structure provides not only a variable explaining the
lack of conflict in the Liberal leadership selection process,
but also can account for the great differences, especially in
terms of the nature of candidates and leaders, betx^een the
selection of Liberal leaders and that characteristic of the
Canadian Conservative and United States’ parties.
The absence of secondary organisation, such as an
independent extra Parliamentary organisation and provincial
parties, relevant to federal leadership selection, and the
character of Cabinet organisation militating against the
emergence of conflict xyithin the Parliamentary elite resulted
in a structural environment generally hostile to elite
coapetition.

The national party convention could not

guarantee the viability of a competitive form of leadership
selection, since the latter depended on the existence of
competing sets of elites and of uncontrolled delegates
desirous and capable of choosing betx/een them.

In the final
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analysis, a merely formal competitive structure, such as the
leadership convention, could not operate effectively in the
absence of environmental conditions conducive to the necessary
degree of internal party conflict.
The leadership convention’s contribution to intra
party democracy xvas also limited of course by its oxvn
characteristics.

Throughout most of its history representation

of Parliamentary elites remained substantial.

Furthermore,

although the convention was established as the sole means of
«

leadership selection, accountability, prior to 1966, was not
either a constitutional or practical requirement of party
leadership.

The lack of accountability and the inapplicability

of the party convention as a basis for internal party conflict
was manifested in the power possessed by the party leader.
First, it V7BS the leader himself, xdio was alx^ays responsible
for the call

of a convention to choose a successor.

Secondly, his pre-eminence as past leader and, in txm of three
cases, as Prime Minister offered him substantial political
resources to intervene in and to influence the process of
leadership selection.
Although the national convention did not function
entirely effectively to promote competition for the party
leadership, a second, latent function was performed by the
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institution,

Tlie leadership convention ser^/ed to provide en

established method of arriving at a collective decision end
thereby to legitimate the character of this decision.

In

this sense, consensus rather than conflict constituted the
primary objective of the mechanism of selection.

The widening

of the selection mechanism, in terms of participation, from
the legislative caucus to representative convention broadened
party involvement in the selection of leaders; hovTever,
rather than encouraging conflict, this extension allowed the
socialisation of important party members \vdth respect to the
choice of party leader and thereby party activity as a whole.
In the Liberal party of Canada, this latent function of the
national party convention has apparently prevailed over the
manifest function of providing for conflict

in

leadership

selection and has represented a major variable accounting
for the consensual nature of the party's selection process.
For at least two reasons, the latent function of
the party convention cannot be considered a sufficient reason
for the prevalence of consensus in the selection
in

the Liberal party.

of leaders

First, the extent of members'

concurrence in the outcome of the functional mechanism depends
to a substantial degree on some form of prior commitment to a
more inclusive purpose.

Thus, participants in leadership
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selection were committed to the concerns and purposes of the
party itself rather than merely to a particular result of the
selection process.

Secondly, only in terms of a pre-existing

consensual variable can differences in leadership selection
of parties, such as the Canadian Liberals and Conservatives,
using similar mechanisms of selection, be explained.
The quality of the party ideology, containing not
only a certain political philosophy but also expressing the
party's position and direction in relation to reality, has
constituted the prior variable determining the consensual
character of leadership selection in the Liberal party.

The

non-class economic ideology as well as the adherence to the
ideas of French-English partnership and of the federal formula
gave the Liberal party an ideological outlook deprecating ,
the utility of conflict and asserting the value of political
cooperation and consensus.

The priority of consensus witnessed

in the selection of Liberal leaders was influenced by the extent
to which these attributes were accepted by participants as
practical, as well as philosophical, guides to action.
The force, which allowed for the influence of these
traits on the determination of leadership was the primacy
accorded to the external goals of the party.

The predominance

of external rather than internal goals derives to some ezctent
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from the very nature of a political party.

As S. J,

Eldersveld describes them, "parties are unique structurally
because they are groups oriented to the achievement of special
goals and functions under unique environmental conditions in
the s o c i e t y . M o r e o v e r ,

the Canadian Liberal party has

developed in the context of a cadre party* s emphasis on the
esctemal goals of electoral success and occupation of
governmental office.

This development has tended to maintain

a high emphasis on the operation of the party in the environ
ment and to resist the entrance of concerns or goals based on
the internal activity of p a r t y , T h e predominance of
external goals expressed in the party ideology, constituted
the linlcage between a party ideology deprecating conflict
and the consensual form of leadership selection characteristic
of the party,

^^Eldersveld, op, cit,. p. 2,
l^In essence this difference reduces to a situation
where the internal dynamics of a party are regarded as either
a means to a given end (electoral success in the Liberal party)
or as to a great degree an end in itself. The desire to build
a social movement at the eiroense of immediate electoral success
characteristic of elements in the Co-operative Commonwealth
Federation is a fine example of the latter. See Young, W, D,,
"pie Anatomy of a Party; The national C.C.F, 1932-1961,
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969;, pp. 177-216.
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The denmnds made by the political and social
environment vnthin which the party operated were such that
an ideology predicated on consensus was most functional in
terms of the accomplishment of the party goals.

The form of

Parliamentary government, in which the capture of executive
power required a stable legislative majority, meant that
unity was a much more immediate requirement of the Liberals,
than of United States* or even of Canadian opposition parties.
Moreover, unity and a consensual party ideology were conducive
to electoral success, given the diverse nature of the
Canadian electorate and society.

Finally, the maintenance

of the political system necessitated adherence to the
federal formula at the expense of revisionist philosophies,
and the integration of French-Canadian political elites.
The nature end pre-eminence of the external goals of
the Liberal party were therefore the foundation for the
consensual nature of leadership selection.

As an internal

and therefore secondary activity of the party, leadership
selection reflected the predominant external goals of the
party.

In effect, the selection of a party leader was

generally regarded as a means, although an essential one,
to accomplish the wider goals of the party in the environ
ment rather than an end in itself.
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The primacy of external goals and the nature of the
party ideology promoted consensual rather than competitive
values in party activity as a tdiole.

Internal processes of

the party were thus conducted ivith the same eschewal of
conflict and preservation of consensus as external activity.
In the final analysis, the high emphasis on consensual
variables in the selection of Liberal leaders derived
substantially from the party*s relation and response to its
environment, as perceived by its members,
Leadership, Leadership Selection And Political Party
In general, leadership selection in the Liberal party
has reflected the basic structure and the ideological
foundation with which the external activity of the Liberal
party

was conducted.

The process by which leadership

emerged was therefore determined in the context of the party
as a whole.

In the Liberal party the environment was most

favourable to a consensual, rather than a conflict, model of
leadership selection,
A consensual form of leadership selection allowed

1 Lipset*s study of trade-union democracy refers to
the "cult unity" enforced on many unions by the necessity of
membership unity in the conduct of bargaining with industry.
Similar to Liberal party ideology, this "cult" hinders the
development of internal pluralism and conflict. See Lipset,
et I C.1,. pp. 270-273,
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that type of compromise, consensual leadership, which has
prevailed in the Liberal party, to emerge.

Both the long

unchallenged tenure, as well as the selection, of Liberal
leaders can be attributed to their performance or potential
performance, as conceived by the party membership, of the
goals and purposes of the Liberal party.

Of course, the

actual practice of party leadership was not unrelated to the
maintenance of these goals.

In fact, the adherence of Liberal

leaders to the goals of electoral success and of the integration
(recruitment) of French-Canadian political elites, after the
necessity of conformity to party goals had declined, testifies
to the reciprocal relationship, in secular terms, of leader
ship and party.
In the final analysis, the nature of party emerges as
a prime determinant of leadership in the Canadian Liberal party.
In this light the performance of political leadership in
Canada must be seen as a partial consequence of the
applicability of party activity end goals to the requirements
of the political system as a whole.

As a corollary, political

party should be considered a significant determining variable
in any complete explication of the meaning of political
leadership,
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